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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the changing role of First Nations in the oil and gas policy community in 
northeastern British Columbia. Prior to the NDP government coming to power in the early 
1990s and prior to some important court cases, First Nation communities were not members of 
the policy community. As a result of these two critical variables--important court cases and NDP 
government policy--the thesis argues that the First Nation communities in northeast British 
Columbia are now members of the oil and gas policy community. This critical power shift has 
resulted in changes to policy, changes to oil and gas development, and changes to the way the 
provincial government, oil and gas companies and the First Nation communities interact with 
each other. 
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Introduction 
The past few decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the role of Aboriginal 
people in policy development. In the past, governments and industry did not perceive a 
need to include Aboriginal people in policy decisions even though these decisions had a 
profound effect on First Nation's communities, lands and resources. Governments and 
industry often developed oil and gas, minerals, and forest products, on lands used by 
Aboriginal peoples, without any meaningful consultation. Events such as the Berger 
Commission inquiry, the landmark Calder, Sparrow and Delgamuukw court cases, the 
inclusion of Aboriginal rights into the 1982 Canadian Constitution Act, and changing 
public opinion have altered governments' and industry's perceived need to consult 
meaningfully with First Nation people and to include them in the development of public 
policy that profoundly affects them. 
One example of this change is the Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) the 
British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines signed with the northeast British 
Columbia Treaty 8 First Nations in 1998 and 1999. The MOUs accompanied the 
emergence of the Oil and Gas Commission (the Commission) opened in 1998 as part of 
the British Columbia government's drive to increase oil and gas activity in the province 
under Premier Glen Clark. The MOUs and resultant Commission policy requires the 
provincial government to consult with First Nations regarding potential effects on their 
treaty and/or Aboriginal rights as a result of proposed oil and gas activity. 
These MOUs and the resultant policy are noteworthy for several reasons. First, 
because of the change that has resulted within the oil and gas regulatory regime. The oil 
and gas industry in Canada has traditionally had a strong lobby and enjoyed a close 
relationship with the provincial governments where resources are developed. 
Stakeholders, such as Aboriginals, have not been welcomed into the policy development 
clique or the regulatory approval regime for fear they may weaken the industry's 
influence within these arenas. 
Second, the policy has given First Nation communities much greater influence 
over oil and gas development and related policy development in the province. For the 
first time they now have mechanisms to address issues at a policy level, through the 
MODs, and at a regulatory level through the Commission policy. The MODs and 
Commission policy and their development may provide a useful model for other policy 
sectors and other jurisdictions in Canada. 
This is a radical change for the oil and gas industry which, prior to 1995, only had 
to meet the legislated requirements set out by government and not try to address any 
issues of a third party that uses the lands. The result is that First Nations, for the first 
time, are brought into the regulatory framework and industry now has to mitigate adverse 
affects to Aboriginal and or treaty rights prior to development approval. The provincial 
government also has a new role as they must determine how the proposed development 
may effect Aboriginal and or treaty rights. 
This thesis investigates the development of the British Columbia oil and gas 
Aboriginal consultation policy and the resultant effect of that policy on industry, the First 
Nation communities, and the provincial government. The thesis seeks to answer the 
following questions: Why did this policy emerge, particularly in this sector? How does 
policy making and regulatory approval work in practice since the introduction of the 
changes? And what have been the consequences for First Nation communities, the oil 
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and gas industry and the provincial government? Using a policy community approach to 
answer these questions, the thesis seeks to explain how First Nation people in northeast 
British Columbia moved from outside the margins of the oil and gas consultation policy 
process into the coveted inner core where policy is actually developed. 
Within this framework, the study gives special attention to two variables. One 
variable is the important legal decisions handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada 
including the Sparrow decision and the Delgamuukw decision. The other variable is the 
change in government in British Columbia when, in 1991, the NDP party was elected to 
power and it subsequently enacted new policies regarding Aboriginal peoples and natural 
resources. The thesis argues that both of these variables played important roles in 
reshaping the oil and gas policy community in northeastern British Columbia. 
Exploration of this subject is significant because of the importance of natural 
resources to British Columbia's and Canada's economies and the ensuing effect this 
policy change has on natural resource development and industry within Canada. To 
fully understand this or any emerging policy we must first understand how and why 
policy changes occur and the subsequent effect of those changes on the players involved 
including governments, industry and stakeholders. The first chapter looks at policy 
community theory and related literature. It will also discuss the literature on Aboriginal 
issues and its significance within the province and within natural resource development. 
Chapter Two looks at the policy community prior to the radical changes of the 
1990s. It will discuss the players, their respective roles and why Aboriginals were not 
included in the policy process. Chapter Three will look at four important legal cases that 
have had a significant effect on Aboriginal issues, natural resource development, and the 
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oil and gas industry, especially in northeast British Columbia. The fourth chapter will 
discuss the particular role of the NDP government in this process and how they were 
instrumental in putting this policy into place. The final chapter examines the effects of 
the changes for stakeholders in the policy community, especially for First Nation 
communities. 
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Chapter 1 Review of Theory and Literature 
This thesis argues that in the 1990s First Nation communities became an integral 
part of the oil and gas policy community in northeast British Columbia. This change was 
a result of two crucial factors: First, a number of important legal decisions gave First 
Nation people additional legal leverage to become actively involved in natural resource 
management and decision making. Second, the election of the new NDP government in 
British Columbia ushered in a fundamentally different direction in Aboriginal policy. 
Prior to the new government, policy did not include Aboriginals in resource management 
or decision making in meaningful ways. With the election of the NDP government, new 
policy now required both the provincial government and industry to consider Aboriginal 
and treaty rights in natural resource decision making. These changes have resulted in 
new roles for the Province of British Columbia, for the oil and gas industry players and 
for the First Nation communities. Specifically, the Province is now taking an active role 
in consulting with Aboriginals regarding possible infringements on treaty and or 
Aboriginal rights and subsequent mitigation strategies. The oil and gas industry has 
accepted the First Nation communities in the northeast into the policy and regulatory 
domain and First Nations themselves enjoy a new level of influence and recognition 
within the oil and gas policy and regulatory communities. 
This thesis endeavours to explain these changes from a policy community 
approach. The study builds on existing research literature on resource policy 
communities and on Aboriginal peoples and resource politics. In addition to the works of 
Michael Howlett and Paul Pross, among others, the study draws special insights from the 
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study by George Hoberg and Edward Morawski on parallel policy changes in the forestry 
sector in Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia. The chapter initially discusses and defines 
key concepts: policy communities, actors, policy networks, the policy regimes and finally 
the sources of policy change. The second part of the chapter focuses on current literature 
on Aboriginal consultation and participation in natural resource policy and development 
in Canada. The final section of the chapter outlines the framework for analysis to 
explain why First Nation people have become part of the oil and gas policy community in 
northeastern British Columbia. 
Key Concepts, Definitions, and Discussion 
A common assumption is that only governments develop policy but in a 
democratic polity, governments depend on a wide range of groups and individuals to 
participate in the policy process. This can include participation from pressure groups, 
industry representatives, academics, interested publics and even the media to bring 
forth information used to develop and establish policy. Such a group is essentially a 
policy community: a group of individuals representing industry, sectors, institutions, 
and the government who together influence and form policy in a given area. In 
natural resource sectors, industry is usually very heavily involved as it brings 
knowledge and expertise to the table, whereas in social policy, organizations 
representing various stakeholder1 groups may be heavily involved. The following 
section presents various definitions of policy communities and discusses related key 
concepts of policy communities, including policy networks, actors, and explanations 
of policy change. 
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Policy Communities 
A policy community, as defined by William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, is 
the part of a political system that has acquired a dominant voice in determining 
government decisions in a field of public activity. This is as a result of its functional 
responsibilities, vested interests and specialized knowledge. Actors within policy 
communities include government agencies, pressure groups, media, and individuals 
such as academics who have an interest in a particular field and attempt to influence 
it.2 
A policy community can also be defined as a broad based association of actors 
who exercise influence over policy over a long period of time. The actors are held 
together by a specific focus or view in respect to the policy in question. Wilks and 
Wright explain a policy community as including " ... all actors or potential actors with a 
direct or indirect interest in a policy area or function who share a common "policy focus," 
and who, with varying degrees of influence shape policy outcomes over the long run. "3 
A third definition stresses the shared knowledge of the actors in a policy community. 
Michael Howlett in his book, Studying Public Policy, draws heavily on Wilks and 
Wright's definition for a policy community and argues that members of a policy 
community are linked together by shared knowledge. He discusses the relationship 
between the state and policy communities based on whether the state and societal 
members share ideas and the degree of consensus between the two.4 
Policy communities can also be described as actors and institutions that are 
directly involved in the policymaking process in a specialized policy area and who follow 
and attempt to influence public policy. Hank C. Jenkins-Smith et al. describe a policy 
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community as "Members of subsystems (that) include representatives of businesses, 
interest groups, trade associations, executive agencies, and relevant legislative 
committees, as well as the elected officials, scholars, and members of the press that 
regularly track and seek to influence the course of public policy in the issue area. "5 
Defining a policy community as that part of a political system that has acquired a 
dominant voice in determining policy outcomes is logical considering why particular 
actors try to influence policy. Generally those actors who have a vested interest and are 
directly affected by the policy, want to track and influence policy so the outcomes are 
more beneficial to them. This is certainly the case with business. It is directly affected 
by natural resource policy and so it would want to have a dominant voice in policy 
making. As Howlett notes, industry would have knowledge of a particular sector and that 
knowledge would be beneficial to state decision-makers. Theorists often argue that 
business has an elevated position or relationship within the policy making process. 
" ... business interest associations possess 'privileged' position in the policy process ... Yet 
business does not always win. From time to time, the state acts autonomously in favour 
of other interests; interests opposed to business may develop organizational structures 
that give them additional leverage in policy conflicts."6 However, Coleman and Skogstad 
go on to argue that 
even when the state intervenes on behalf of non-business interests and financially 
supports their organizations, ... such interests are vulnerable to challenge by other 
state agencies or business interest groups. Thus, it is important to note that even 
within pressure pluralist policy networks, all interests are not at the same level of 
organizational development. Again, business interest associations appear more 
likely to have reached a higher level of development than other societal groups.7 
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As has been noted, the actors that comprise policy communities have a strong 
effect on that policy community. Theorists have divided actors within policy 
communities in a variety of ways: by policy networks which categorize actors within a 
policy community; by the sub-government and the attentive public, those who actually 
make policy and those who merely influence policy; and by purposive and non-
purposive, based on the type of interest actors have in a policy community. 
Policy Networks 
The concept of a policy network is prevalent within the literature and is described 
as a smaller group of actors within the policy community, who work together, who 
usually share a common goal, and who may have similar motivations. Howlett defines 
policy networks again using Wilks and Wright's definition. He compares a policy 
community to a policy network arguing that 
... 'community' refer(s) to a more inclusive category of all those involved in 
policy formulation, and ... restrict(s) 'network' to a subset of community 
members who interacted with each other on a regular basis. In their view, 
'Policy community identifies those actors and potential actors drawn from the 
policy universe who share a common policy focus ... ' This approach integrates 
2 different sets of motivations guiding the actions of those involved in policy 
formulation: knowledge or expertise, and material interest. Thus a policy 
community is based on specific knowledge base while a policy network is 
based on pursuit of some material interest.8 
Actors within a policy network share more than the policy field, which is 
shared by all the policy community participants. They have a unique relationship 
with each other because they share a particular approach to the policy issues and thus 
develop a relationship with the state, other actors, or policy communities. Coleman 
and Skogstad define a policy network as " ... the relationships among the particular set 
of actors that forms around an issue of importance to the policy community."9 The 
main difference between a network and a policy community is that the policy 
community exists because a policy field exists, whereas a network exists because 
those in it share an approach to policy. Policy communities divide or break down into 
policy networks. 1° Coleman and Skogstad argue that within a policy community 
different types of networks may exist as actors react to different issues. The networks 
may interact differently with the state or with other policy communities to the extent 
that the way policy is made or influenced is distinct. 11 
A policy community develops a distinctive culture based on its networks, 
particular actors, and policy outcomes . 
... policy communities are institutions in themselves and become integrated to 
greater or lesser degrees by developing a set of shared values, norms and 
beliefs which shape the policy networks that emerge and, ultimately, the policy 
outcomes in the given sector. Attention must be given to understanding the 
rules of the game and the strength of the belief systems that predominate in a 
policy community. 12 
An example of a policy network would be a group of industry actors such as 
companies in the oil and gas industry, that hold shared values and strive for similar 
policy outcomes. Industry has a material interest in the policy outcomes and 
according to Coleman and Skogstad the industry network itself would have its own 
culture and belief systems. 
Actors 
Another way to distinguish actors within the policy community is based on 
their level of influence on policy. That is, do they actually make policy or do they 
simply influence policy? Pross is one of the few theorists who differentiates the 
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actors within a policy community based on their level of influence. He distinguishes 
between the sub-government and the attentive public; the former are those that 
actually make policy and the latter are those that only influence policy. The sub-
government is composed of government agencies, interest associations and societal 
organizations such as business firms that actually make policy in a given sector. The 
attentive public is more loosely knit and may contain experts, media and others who 
are interested in the sector. The attentive public attempts to influence policy but does 
not regularly participate in policy making as the sub-government does. 13 
The difference between the sub-government and the attentive public gives 
credence to Wilks and Wright's definition of a policy community containing actors 
with varying degrees of influence. Those with the greatest influence are part of the 
sub-government. This also ties in with the actors having varying degrees of 
knowledge, a factor Howlett stresses. Logically, those with the greatest degree of 
knowledge would likely be part of the sub-government. 
A further way to group actors within a policy community is by looking at their 
reason for being a member of the policy community. Does the actor receive some direct 
benefit from the policy outcome or are they representing a broad-based group that does 
not receive a direct benefit but is concerned about the greater good or an indirect interest? 
Melody Hessing and Michael Howlett argue that actors within a policy community can 
be divided into those that are productive and those that are non-productive. Productive 
actors have a direct material interest in the policy process. Within a natural resource 
sector they include the holders or capitalizers of the means of production, those who have 
equipment and labour used in extracting the resource, as well as the landowner to whom 
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rents are paid for the resource. This landowner or resource owner in Canada and 
certainly in British Columbia is the government and is a category that is not necessarily 
common to non-resource sectors. The productive actors can be lumped together into a 
policy network as they have a distinct material interest in the development of the natural 
resource. 14 
Non-productive interests include those that represent broad public interests. In 
the resource domain Hessing and Howlett include " ... health, recreational, community, 
gender, First Nations, environmental, and educational concerns." as non-productive 
interests. 15 
Similar to the productive, non-productive dichotomy Howlett puts forth, Jenkins-
Smith divides the policy community into material and purposive actors where the former 
pursue fairly narrow interests in whatever way is possible, typically profits, while the 
latter pursue broader ideological based goals that are limiting in that " .. .to deviate is to 
risk loss of membership." 16 The material actors closely resemble the productive actors 
and the non-productive actors resemble the purposive actors. 
In essence, purposive groups have ideological goals directed at a broad audience 
with little latitude for deviation from the ideological goals, while material groups have 
generally narrow goals directed at a small audience but have great latitude for deviation 
to achieve those goals. 
There are other actors or institutions that may have a significant effect on policy 
but are not ongoing or direct participants within the policy community. The most critical 
in this case is the judicial system. Hessing and Howlett include the judicial system within 
the realm of the government or state actor. This realm comprises the elected government 
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party and its leaders, the bureaucracy including appointed officials, and the judicial 
system. 17 
The judicial system is designed to provide a reasonably impartial means of 
adjudicating issues defined by statute or the common law. It also provides for the 
evaluation of policy through its decisions on matters brought before the courts .. .it 
constructs a context in which ongoing policy efforts are directed and therefore can affect 
which policy options are considered and which are not. 18 
The judicial environment is important, as the thesis will argue that court decisions 
were crucial in shaping consultation and regulatory policy through court cases and 
judicial reviews where courts evaluate decisions made by the regulatory agencies. The 
Aboriginal actors within the province and within this policy domain strategically used 
litigation to influence public policy and legislation. 
The influence actors or networks may have on the policy community and the 
policy outcome is not static over time. Their level of influence may change because of 
institutions such as the judicial system or because of the elected party, the bureaucrats or 
external events. Toner and Doern present a case where actors tried to influence public 
policy during a crisis situation. Their premise is that during the oil shocks of 1973 and 
1979-1980 pressure groups such as the oil and gas industry groups in Canada had less 
influence within the policy community because of an external event such as OPEC's 
effect on prices, and because of intensive federal-provincial bargaining which left non-
governmental groups out of the decision making loop. 19 As a result, the industry 
pressure group tried to exert their influence over as wide an audience as possible to 
regain their influence within the policy community.20 
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In a similar United States case, government bureaucrats reacting to external 
events changed the balance of power within a policy community by drastically changing 
their stance on a particular policy issue. Jenkins-Smith et. al. argue that even in 
relatively stable policy subsystems, government agencies or bureaucracies influence the 
policy community as they move between polar opposites on a given policy issue, in this 
case offshore leasing for energy exploration, when reacting to external events like price 
shifts or crises. 21 
Aboriginal Participation in Natural Resource Development 
Within the literature concerning Aboriginals, there is little discussion about 
changing models of Aboriginal participation in natural resource development with 
Aboriginals as policy community members, or as participants that set or influence policy 
outside of land claim models or self-government models. The treaty process within 
British Columbia has afforded an opportunity for discussion regarding meaningful 
Aboriginal participation in natural resource development as an interim measure while 
treaty negotiations are underway. Unfortunately, little has happened beyond the 
discussion stage unless the Aboriginal groups have employed civil disobedience or 
depended on the courts to force acceptance of their participation. This section will 
summarize the literature concerning Aboriginal participation in natural resource 
development and in particular focus on an article by George Hoberg and Edward 
Morawski and a specific situation in British Columbia where First Nations in the 
Clayoquot Sound area became co-managers of the forest resource with the provincial 
government. The Hoberg article draws a close parallel to the case this thesis will 
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consider namely, Aboriginal participation in the oil and gas consultation and regulatory 
policy community in northeast British Columbia. The literature starts with government 
reports and evolves towards surveys of Aboriginal involvement in resource development. 
Theoretical models based on specific case studies have added academic rigour to the 
literature. Finally, gaps in the literature will be discussed along with the unique 
contribution to the literature that this thesis makes. 
Literature Review 
Government Reports 
Anthropological literature on Aboriginal peoples clearly articulates the unique 
and important relationship between the people and the land. Interestingly however, in the 
modem context, this crucial relationship is largely ignored when development of natural 
resources is discussed. Within the existing legislative umbrella, few models exist that 
provide Aboriginal people a meaningful opportunity to participate in policy creation or 
decision-making around natural resource development. 
A work that has made a significant contribution to the literature and to the recent 
history of Canada is Thomas Berger's report on the proposal to build the Mackenzie 
Valley Pipeline. Berger actually took the inquiry to the Aboriginal people of the north 
and in an 
... unprecedented .. . holistic approach to analyzing the impact of a project...(the) 
inquiry did not treat the building of a pipeline as a mere technical or engineering 
problem, nor did they restrict themselves to economic feasibility studies or 
standard environmental impact assessments. They went further to study the 
consequences of possible ecological changes for the people's land-based 
economy ... and examined the general social and economic impact of large-scale 
development on northern people ... . the inquiries were a clear departure from the 
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blind reliance on "expert" opinion, as they offered a chance for local people to 
share their experiences and to express their feelings and expectations. 22 
Berger's report was also unique in that he recommended the pipeline not be built 
for at least ten years so that land claims may be settled. He stressed the importance of the 
traditional subsistence economy and the need for it to be strengthened instead of replaced 
or weakened so that the northern people retain a sense of control over their lives and 
culture and are not solely dependent on the industrial, wage economy.23 Berger 
understood that without settled land claims and without a strong subsistence economy, 
there would be no co-development. Instead, development would be wholly southern 
imposed and southern controlled. 
Almost a decade later, the Bruntland Commission concurred with Berger's 
assessment. 
The starting point for a just and humane policy for such groups (indigenous and 
tribal groups) is the recognition and protection of their traditional rights to land 
and the other resources that sustain their way of life ... And this recognition must 
also give local communities a decisive voice in the decisions about resource use 
in their area. 24 
Thomas Berger argued that this recognition could not happen because the dominant 
society rejected most aspects of Aboriginal life. "Native religion had to be replaced; 
native customs had to be rejected; native uses of the land could not, once the fur trade had 
been superseded by the search for minerals, oil and gas, be regarded as socially important 
or economically significant."25 Other authors have discussed Aboriginal uses of the land 
and the significance both economically and socially of that usage however there is still a 
dearth of literature regarding models of how Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals can share 
the resources and share the responsibility to manage the development of the resources 
and uses of the land. 26 
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One of the most recent Canadian government reports should be mentioned largely 
because of its encapsulation and dissemination of a cross-section of public opinion. 
"Gathering Strength" is the output from the work of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples. The Royal Commission asked the following question to people 
across Canada. "What are foundations of a fair and honourable relationship between the 
Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people of Canada?"27 The answer the Royal Commission 
received is that Aboriginals need control over their lives, over lands, resources and self-
government. They also need time, space and respect from Canada to heal and revitalize. 28 
It is interesting to note that these three government reports were completed in consecutive 
decades starting in the 1970s, one being international in scope, yet they give the same 
message: that Aboriginal peoples need control over their lives. This includes, in 
particular, control over development of resources. The task within Canada then is to 
identify models or processes to facilitate this sharing of control; within existing treaties, 
within modem treaties, and in areas where no treaties exist. The first and the last 
circumstance pose the greatest challenge. 
Survey Of Aboriginal Parlicipation in Natural Resource Development 
A valuable source in the literature regarding Aboriginal participation in natural 
resource development across Canada and across resource sectors is a book by Claudia 
Notzke. This work covers all resource sectors and includes cases in all provinces and 
territories. Notzke's book Aboriginal Peoples and Natural Resources in Canada looks at 
models and situations across Canada where Aboriginal people have had some 
participation in the development or management of natural resources and where their lack 
17 
of participation has had deleterious effects on the people and their environment. 
Specific examples of lack of participation can be found in most natural resource sectors. 
Of interest are those in the oil and gas industry where development occurred on Alberta 
reserves and the resultant unexpected wealth wreaked havoc on the reserve population 
resulting in suicides and social upheaval.29 In British Columbia, Notzke argues that non-
renewable resource development on reserve is " ... characterized by an overall denial of 
Indian interest and jurisdiction ... "30 Examples of situations where Aboriginal people do 
have some participation in natural resource development include the James Bay 
Agreement and Northern Quebec Agreemene1 and the Metis Settlement Land Act of 
1988 in Alberta.32 
Similar to Notzke's work but on a much smaller scale is an article by Jackie 
Wolfe-Keddie in Resource and Environmental Management in Canada. Wolfe-
Keddie's article covers two familiar variables in the discussion about Aboriginal peoples 
and resource management: recent court cases and treaty rights. Wolfe-Keddie begins 
with a discussion of recent court decisions and the effect those decisions have had on 
natural resource development. This is a consistent theme throughout the literature since 
recent important cases such as Sparrow and Delgamuukw have changed legal opinion 
about Aboriginal people's rights. Wolfe-Keddie then proceeds into a discussion about 
recent land claims and the land base and control modem Aboriginal treaty signators hold 
over the various types of land. This subject has been widely discussed in the literature by 
authors such as William Morrison, David Elliot, and James Frideres. These works focus 
on modem land claims mostly in northern Canada where Aboriginal people now control 
vast tracts of land. In some cases surrounding land is managed or co-managed by the 
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Aboriginal group and the federaUterritorial government. Under these new regimes 
Aboriginal peoples now have direct control over resource management or at least share 
control with the regional governments. 
Finally, Wolfe-Keddie ventures into territory seldom discussed in the literature, 
the emerging models for Aboriginal participation outside modem comprehensive treaties, 
namely co-management and factors critical to the success of such relationships including 
recognition of traditional ecological knowledge. 
Many co-governance models that exist in Canada today are not based on 
partnerships with provincial or federal governments, but instead exist because industry 
has chosen to bring Aboriginals into the decision making process, either as regulators, co-
developers, or as environmental remediators. A work that does an industry-based survey 
is by Pamela Sloan and Roger Hill, Corporate Aboriginal Relations: Best Practice Case 
Studies. It presents some of the existing models that have developed through cooperative 
efforts between industry and Aboriginals. Unfortunately, without the state's involvement 
it is difficult to sustain such cooperative efforts and to apply them in alternate sectors or 
jurisdictions. 
An example of one successful joint venture in the fishing industry is between the 
Baffin Regional Inuit Association and Farocan, a private southern corporation. The 
corporation supplies the management, technical expertise and capital equipment for a 
shrimp fishing enterprise and the Inuit provide the fishing licenses and labour to do the 
fishing. The initiative has provided employment for the Inuit and an opportunity to 
purchase an interest in the capital equipment. 33 This venture was established to boost 
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Inuit employment as well as the commercial fishery. If it can also assist to manage the 
resource it will truly be a co-management venture. 
Theoretical Models 
The government reports provide the context, the background, and even the 
solutions broadly stated. The surveys provide the information about what is happening in 
industry, in communities, and in resource sectors. Without theoretical concepts or 
models the reports and surveys remain simply information or specific case studies. The 
following works will present theoretical models that can be used to do rigorous 
comparisons and a.11alysis and perhaps eventually lead policy community actors to cases 
that can be successfully replicated across sectors and jurisdictions. 
A 1997 work by Melody Hessing and Michael Howlett though not Aboriginal in 
focus includes Aboriginals as a variable while analyzing the resource and environmental 
policy process in Canada. They conclude that Aboriginals are not an integral part of the 
policy community and generally are not part of the policy network where the state and 
industry actors make most decisions. "First Nations participation in the resource policy 
subsystem is sporadic and sector specific."34 In some sectors such as fisheries and parks 
management they play a primary role including a co-management role but the authors do 
not expound on what type of models the co-management assumes and whether the state 
entered into these models by choice or was forced to act because of litigation. Within 
other sectors they argue that the Aboriginal people's participation is discretionary and 
largely restricted to policy formation rather than implementation. They predict 
participation by Aboriginals will increase and the existing resource and environmental 
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policy paradigm will change as a result of the land claims issue, the increasing profile of 
First Nations, and the trend toward self-govemment.35 
George Hoberg and Edward Morawski examine a situation m the Clayoquot 
Sound area of British Columbia where a local First Nation actually achieved co-
management status in forestry development through civil disobedience. They examine 
the events that led up to this historic partnership and the factors that led to policy change. 
Hoberg and Morawski frame the policy change within a policy community 
context and they also introduce the idea of two policy communities in two separate 
sectors coming together or intersecting and resulting in policy change. The sectors are the 
forestry sector and the Aboriginal policy sector. The intersection occurs in the Clayoquot 
Sound area and results from the strategic actions of the Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations and 
environmentalists to bring about change. They argue the intersection does not encompass 
all aspects of the Aboriginal policy community such as fisheries, tourism and mining but 
it does encompass the entire forestry policy community in the Clayoquot area. 
The co-management model discussed here is significant and came about because 
of several occurrences. The courts played a role by granting Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations 
an injunction to stop logging on Meares Island, an area within the Sound and within the 
First Nation's traditional territory, claimed under the treaty process. Civil disobedience 
throughout the Sound by both environmentalists and Nuu-chah-nulth First Nations in the 
form of roadblocks made logging difficult for the companies and both occurrences forced 
government to become actively involved in the situation. 
The authors discuss some of the important legal decisions that resulted in the 
injunction being granted and the critical role the courts played in bringing about a change 
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in policy. The authors note that although a co-management model has been established 
the provincial government has worked hard to contain this model to this area. They do 
not want this to spread to other geographic areas or policy sectors either as interim 
measures or within treaties. 36 This is consistent within the literature arguing that 
governments are loath to enter into such co-management arrangements unless they are 
forced to, usually as a result of court decisions. 37 
The discussion of the policy communities prior to the First Nation group 
achieving co-management illustrates the control formerly held by the state and industry. 
Environmental groups had been successful at making some inroads in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s but the First Nation group had not. The former utilized public opinion 
successfully while the latter depended almost entirely on the courts. These causal 
variables are different and result in divergent outcomes. The First Nation group achieves 
co-management using the courts but the environmentalists, using changing public 
opinion, achieve some influence in the process but do not achieve co-management and do 
not achieve a place within the sub-government sphere of the policy community. 
Building Theory - Examination of a New Case 
The existing literature has provided useful information, insights, and examples for 
study. However, more cases and examples are needed to successfully build theory. It 
would be useful if there were cases that look at diverse economic sectors and cases that 
highlight alternate cooperative models. The Clayoquot Sound situation provides an 
important look at a forestry sector case where a form of co-management has been 
established between the state and a First Nation group outside of a modern treaty 
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arrangement. Hoberg and Morawski's theoretical construct involving policy communities 
and introducing policy intersection is a valuable addition to the literature. It provides a 
close example to the case that this thesis will discuss, that of Treaty 8 First Nation 
participation within the oil and gas consultation and regulatory policy communities in the 
northeast area of British Columbia. The oil and gas case will illustrate an alternative 
cooperative arrangement where the First Nation communities have joined the state and 
industry as powerful aCtors within the policy community. This discussion will add an 
additional case to the literature on policy communities and on cooperative models. 
There are some similarities and some differences between the Clayoquot case and 
the oil and gas case. The economic sectors are different, forestry in the Clayoquot case 
and oil and gas in the Treaty 8 case. The outcomes are also different in that the 
Clayoquot case resulted in a co-management agreement, while the oil and gas case 
resulted in the First Nation's inclusion in the policy community but did not result in co-
management. Similarities involve the importance of court decisions as an agent of 
change and the philosophy of the NDP government in terms of including First Nations in 
resource development decision-making. This thesis argues that because of First Nation 
people's use of the court system and the resulting decisions, the provincial government 
chose to respond with particular policy outputs. These policy outcomes resulted not in 
co-management as in the Clayoquot case but in the First Nation group's entrance into the 
oil and gas policy community and of their influence on regulatory decision-making and 
policy development. This is vastly different from the place Treaty 8 First Nation people 
held within the oil and gas policy community before the NDP came to power. 
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Of particular interest in this case is the fact that in the northeast area of British 
Columbia the First Nation groups are covered by Treaty 8. This is an important factor 
and provides an important case to the literature. Unrest in historic treaty areas is already 
festering and will continue until the various provincial governments begin to include First 
Nation groups into land and resource management decisions and regimes. The outcomes 
in this case developed as a result of joint efforts by the provincial government, industry 
and First Nations. It may prove to be a model that is applicable in other jurisdictions and 
in other economic sectors. 
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Chapter2 Policy Community Before Aboriginals Were Involved 
Prior to the mid 1990s, First Nation groups in northeast British Columbia were 
not part of the oil and gas policy community. That domain was controlled firmly by the 
provincial government and by the oil and gas industry. These two actors worked closely 
to develop the hydrocarbon resources located largely in the northeastern part of the 
province. The First Nation people in the region have tried over the years to become part 
of the decision making process since oil and gas development has a significant effect on 
the lives and lands used by First Nation people. Until the 1990s, the provincial 
government was unwilling to allow them into the sub-government segment of the policy 
community. While various industry actors were willing to consult with the First Nation 
communities and work with them on socio-economic and traditional heritage protection 
issues, industry was largely reticent to accept the First Nation group as decision makers 
within the policy community. 
This chapter will look at what the oil and gas policy community looked like prior 
to the mid 1990s without the active participation of the northeast First Nation 
communities. It will explore the actors within the policy community, the provincial 
government and the oil and gas industry players, as well as the Aboriginal communities 
in the northeast, some of whom would eventually become members of the policy 
community. A brief discussion of the northeast area itself will provide a context and 
setting for the industry and resident actors. Finally it will review the question of why the 
Aboriginal groups were not part of the policy community and give some background 
about provincial policies up to the 1990s. 
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The Actors: The Oil and Gas Industry, The BC Government and Aboriginal Peoples 
The critical players that made up the sub-government of the oil and gas policy 
community included the oil and gas industry, various departments of the British 
Columbia government including the Ministry of Energy and Mines, in Victoria and in 
Fort St. John.1 Other government departments involved in approvals included the 
Ministry of Forests, Ministry of Environment and Parks and Ministry of Lands in the 
northeast region. These parties had a direct influence on policy. 
Industry 
In Canada, oil and gas companies have traditionally retained a strong and pro-
active role in attempting to influence government policy affecting their industry. This 
has been especially true since the early 1980s when the federal Liberal government 
established the industry-despised national energy policy which had a profound impact on 
the industry as a whole. 2 The somewhat insular oil and gas industry has never welcomed 
interference in policy making by other players such as environmental groups or 
Aboriginal groups that have frequently tried to establish influence in the industry policy 
setting arena. The insular nature and active lobbying by the industry is perhaps partially 
due to the small number of companies that originally made up the industry worldwide 
and their incredible dominance over several decades. Although that dominance has been 
challenged in jurisdictions globally and largely reduced, the independence of the industry 
seems to have remained largely intact. In Canada, the lobbying arm of the industry is 
institutionalized within the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP). 
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CAPP, representing approximately 165 producer companies that produce almost 
95% of Canada's natural gas and crude oil, has an annual budget of $9 million and has a 
staff Canada wide of 45 people. The association also represents 135 associate member 
companies that provide a broad range of services to the industry.3 The association is 
active in lobbying and attempting to influence governments of all levels from the federal 
level down to local levels if necessary. The staff is well educated and trained in various 
aspects of the industry, in effective communication techniques, and in lobbying.4 Many 
of the current staff members have worked in the industry or in government. CAPP and its 
predecessor, the Canadian Petroleum Association (CPA), have been very effective in 
ensuring industry's message and wishes are efficiently communicated on an ongoing and 
timely basis. 
At present there are many companies active in northeast British Columbia. The 
companies generally bring their concerns and issues to the British Columbia government 
themselves and through CAPP. CAPP has a close working relationship with the British 
Columbia government. This has been the case for several decades. 
A number of companies active in northeast British Columbia in the early 1990s 
formed a group to discuss Aboriginal issues. Representatives from industry realized that 
they needed to better understand the issues and concerns of the First Nation communities 
and to work with the communities to resolve these issues. Community members from 
each of the reserves were invited to attend what was to become the Northeast Industry 
Group (Industry Group). The Industry Group formed largely because several companies 
were working in areas of great significance to the communities and there were 
outstanding issues that were not being addressed. One of the companies, Amoco, was 
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proposing to explore in the sacred Twin Sisters area. A subsequent court case concerning 
this project will be discussed in Chapter Three. 
The majority of the companies that attended the Industry Group meetings realized 
that the First Nation people affected by oil and gas activity needed to have a process to 
resolve outstanding issues. Government was invited to participate in the Industry Group 
but did so mostly as observers. There were companies active in the area that did not 
attend the Industry Group meetings and did not attempt to work with the communities to 
resolve issues. 5 
The Western sedimentary basin is the source of most of Canada's current 
conventional oil and gas production. Other areas such as the far north and the eastern 
seaboard are still in an exploratory or early production stage. At present most of the 
production still stems from Alberta, with small pockets in southwestern Saskatchewan 
and northeastern British Columbia rounding out the known production and reserves in the 
sedimentary basin. In British Columbia, 100% of production at present comes from the 
northeastern area of the province. That is the area on which this thesis will focus. 
The northeast area of British Columbia is bordered on the west and south by the 
Rocky Mountains and on the east and north by the Alberta and Yukon/Northwest 
Territories borders respectively. The sub-surface is an extension of the western 
sedimentary basin while the surface is an extension of the prairies. The region consists of 
almost one-third of the land base of British Columbia but has only about three percent of 
the province's population. Almost all of British Columbia's oil and gas production lies 
within this area but the industry comprises only 2.33% of the GDP of the province.6 
Thus, historically, neither the industry nor the region has been given much attention by 
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governments in Victoria. Although the oil and gas industry is critical to the area in terms 
of income and jobs it historically has held little sway in the provincial capital, especially 
when compared to forestry, which is the dominant provincial industry. 
Since the industry began operations in the province in the 1940s, $8.8 billion has 
been directly contributed to the provincial economy in the form of revenue.7 In 1999, 
gross revenue was $587.3 million.8 The individual companies' expenditures in the 
province are not included in these figures and they provide another $20 million spent in 
the province from 1985 through to 1999.9 
Employment in the oil and gas sector includes unskilled labour and specialized 
skilled jobs. The British Columbia industry has developed and exported skills, 
technology, and labour to the Middle East, Siberia, South America, and North Sea sites. 
The same skills are developed and retained in the province to support the industry here. 
In 1989, all subsurface activity including mining provided 1.8 percent of total workforce 
in the province of British Columbia. This is direct employment, only, it does not include 
the service industry that supports the primary sector. 10 
The oil and gas industry is also important to the province because of the supply of 
product that the province receives and the excess it exports. In 1990, total supply of 
natural gas was 418 petajoules and provincial demand was 245 petajoules. Excess 
natural gas is exported to other provinces and the United States, especially California. 11 
Crude oil production provided the province with 73 petajoules while provincial 
requirements equalled 388 petajoules. 12 The additional crude oil required is imported 
from Alberta. "British Columbia's current energy requirements are supplied by the 
following fuel types: 37% by oil, 22% by natural gas, 22% by woodwaste and other fuel 
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types, and 19% by electricity."13 Of the energy required, only a portion of the crude oil 
has to be imported, the province provides the remaining, plus substantial exports. 
The Provincial Government 
Prior to 1991 when the New Democratic Party (NDP) was elected, the province of 
British Columbia was governed, for the better part of four decades, by the Social Credit 
Party (Socreds) except for a brief period in the early 1970s when Dave Barrett's NDP 
formed a government. The Socreds have traditionally enjoyed the support of business in 
the province and their political agenda included actively developing the vast resources of 
the province and opening up the hinterland areas to accelerate and support that 
development. The NDP on the other hand, historically garnered most of its support from 
labour and some of the large urban areas of the province. It has had little support in the 
hinterland regions, especially the northeast. 
Given the Socred's close relationship with business, including the oil and gas 
industry, the government and the industry worked closely together to set policy and to 
develop the resources of the province. It was not uncommon for the industry 
representatives, based on the existing regulatory and policy environment in Alberta, to 
suggest policies and procedures to the government in British Columbia. The Socreds 
adopted many of the industry's suggestions. Thus the two parties worked closely together 
in setting policy and regulations concerning the exploration and production of oil and gas. 
From the 1950s, when the industry started to become active, until the 1980s there 
were few groups that bothered to challenge the pre-eminence of the government and the 
companies as the primary policy setters within the policy community. The environmental 
32 
groups and the First Nation communities were the main contesters for a voice in the oil 
and gas regulatory process and policy in the region. The environment groups had 
intermittent success, depending on the economy and relative importance of 
environmental concerns on the political agenda. 14 The main environmental group active 
in the area was the Chetwynd Environmental Society. The First Nation group had 
almost no success in getting their concerns on the policy agenda. They wanted the 
provincial government to work with them to protect their treaty and Aboriginal rights 
when natural resources were developed. The provincial government did not see 
protection of treaty and Aboriginal rights as their role as there were no legislative or legal 
reasons, at that time, to cooperate with the Aboriginal people. 15 They were continually 
referred to the federal government to seek redress for their treaty and land use issues. 
The next section will discuss British Columbia's historic view of Aboriginal issues. 
The Aboriginal Players 
The Aboriginal players within the northeast area of the province are the members 
of the First Nation reserves covered by Treaty 8 and those Aboriginal peoples living in 
Kelly Lake, a community populated by treaty, non-treaty, and Metis peoples. The First 
Nation reserves are Fort Nelson First Nation, Prophet River First Nation, Halfway River 
First Nation, Blueberry River First Nation, Doig River First Nation, West Moberly First 
Nation, and Saulteau First Nation. The communities within the region are made up 
largely of Slavey, Beaver, Cree, and Saulteau peoples. 16 Many of the Kelly Lake people 
are from Iroquois descent. Historically, the Peace River area was largely populated by 
the Beaver people but the Cree pushed them north and west and intermarried with them. 17 
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The Iroquois people from Kelly Lake came from Eastern Canada as guides and remained 
in the Peace River area also intermarrying with the local Beaver and Cree populations. 
The Slavey traditionally lived in the area farther north around Fort Nelson. 
Treaty 8 was signed in 1899 and most of the groups in northeast British Columbia 
adhered to the treaty between 1899 and 1915. 18 The treaty was extended to this area 
because of the Yukon gold-rush and the need for gold-seekers to make their way safely 
through the Peace region without being threatened by the local Indian population. 19 
Thus this is the only area in British Columbia covered by one of the numbered treaties 
which were signed in much of southern Canada. 
The First Nation communities are at times represented by Treaty 8 Tribal 
Association, a central office directed to administer various programs and deal with issues 
common to all the communities. In the 1980s and 1990s, Treaty 8 Tribal Association has 
represented the First Nation communities in their efforts to have some influence with 
regard to oil and gas policy and procedures. The communities were seldom successful in 
these endeavours to influence policy. The underlying reasons for the lack of influence lie 
with government policy that had been in place for over 100 years. The provincial 
government demonstrated no intention of changing their policy until the courts forced 
them to do so. This study will focus on the First Nation communities of Treaty 8 in 
northeast British Columbia as they are the group that have become a part of the policy 
community in oil and gas development. 
The next chapter will discuss the role the courts eventually played to encourage 
more First Nation input in both policy and practice across a wide spectrum of areas 
including oil and gas development. 
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Why Aboriginal Players Were Not Part of The Policy Community 
Prior to some of the landmark court cases and important events that have shaped 
Aboriginal and natural resource policy in British Columbia, Aboriginal people and 
Aboriginal issues had little relevance in policy making and in fact Aboriginal people 
were given little opportunity to submit their views on issues that affected them. This was 
not because the Aboriginal people did not express their views but rather that their views 
did not fit with the current practices and ideology of governments, industry, policy 
makers and the general public. Until critical legal cases were decided and particular 
events occurred, policy makers had little impetus to change. 
One of the basic assumptions of the European occupation of British Columbia 
was that the land was "essentially empty and unused until it was discovered and put to 
use by Whites."20 British Columbia differed from most other provinces in Canada in that 
the province, until recently, consistently ignored alternative "historical interpretations and 
legal principles commonly applied elsewhere. "21 Other jurisdictions signed treaties with 
Aboriginal people acknowledging they held Aboriginal title and had rights to land and 
treaty rights. British Columbia, for the most part, did not follow this practice. 
The principle of 'discovery' was a traditional theory promulgated by U.S. Justice 
Marshall in 1823 and later used in Canadian Aboriginal rights law. "Aboriginal lands 
could be considered vacant and subject to discovery because of the method of Aboriginal 
land use and the superiority of English institutions. "22 British Columbia governments 
have continued to use this concept of 'discovery' as recently as in the trial court decision 
of Delgamuukw in the early 1990s to assert British sovereignty. 23 
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Religion also came into play when 'discovery' was applied by European Christians 
to non-Christians or pagans, who as a result, had no claim to sovereignty and related land 
rights.24 Another name for 'discovery' is 'terra nullius', used by Columbus and other Old 
World Explorers and conquering nations to proclaim that the New World belonged to no 
one and " ... the colonizers could occupy the lands of Indigenous peoples without their 
consent. "25 
Consistent with the belief that the land was empty was the belief by the Europeans 
that the Aboriginals had no title and limited rights to the land. Legally it was argued that 
"Aboriginal title was contingent on Crown recognition" of that title. This dated from the 
1888 St. Catherine Milling Case in Ontario. This premise was not effectively challenged 
until the Calder case in 1973.26 
In Paul Tennant's comprehensive overview of Aboriginal history in British 
Columbia, he argues that notwithstanding the court's view of title prior to 1973, the 
history and documents surrounding the Douglas Treaties on Vancouver Island clearly 
indicate that James Douglas believed the Indians owned the lands.27 It was not until later 
that this view was refuted by Douglas himself and adhered to by his successors and future 
British Columbia govemments.28 In fact, the elected Assembly and the people of the 
colony of British Columbia in the early 1860s also accepted the view that the Indians 
held title and that it must be extinguished with treaties. 29 
Once the British Columbia government adopted the policy that Aboriginal people 
had no title and limited rights they proceeded with developing and opening the province 
with no thought to Aboriginal people's traditional and historic use of the land. The 
Aboriginal people were not consulted in British Columbia or elsewhere in Canada when 
resources were developed, or when land was taken for farming or settlement. Robin 
Fisher states that under Douglas there was consultation with Aboriginal groups about 
reserve size and placement but under Joseph Trutch and subsequent administrations, 
consultation effectively ended even about critical issues such as the size and placement of 
reserves. 30 
Tennant asserts that the British Columbia government held this view into the 
1990s. In the 1960s, the· province realized there were bound to be some Aboriginal title 
cases in the courts so they prepared their arguments for that eventuality. They argued 
that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 did not apply to British Columbia. This 
proclamation states that Aboriginal title exists. Second, they argued that if the courts 
decided that title existed then that title was implicitly extinguished by actions and 
legislation of the British Columbia government or explicitly by Confederation. 31 
Along with the terra nullius concept and lack of Aboriginal title was also the view 
that Aboriginal people had few Aboriginal rights except those given to Aboriginal people 
by the treaties. Michael Asch holds up the 1973 Calder case as the turning point in 
Canadian legal tradition when the Supreme Court questioned the prevailing view that 
Aboriginal people had no Aboriginal rights as they did not live in societies prior to the 
arrival of the Europeans.32 The inherent rights theory is now an accepted theory in 
Canadian law and it is based on the belief that Aboriginal rights stem from a source 
independent of Crown recognition. 33 
In the late 1960s the Nisga'a brought the Calder case against the government of 
British Columbia. The case was actually lost by the Nisga'a over a technicality, however, 
it was important because the Supreme Court justices for the first time" .. . recognized 
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Aboriginal title as a legal right derived from the Indian's historic occupation and 
possession of their triballands."34 The Supreme Court justices were divided on whether 
that title had been extinguished. 35 After this case the federal government opened treaty 
negotiations with the Nisga'a people in British Columbia. Even though the Canadian 
government reacted to the Calder case and changed their policy, the provincial 
government refused to participate in negotiations or change their Aboriginal policy for 
another 17 years.36 
The 1973 Calder Supreme Court decision was one of the first of a series of events 
that brought Aboriginal issues onto the political agenda. Several more important court 
cases would follow including Guerin in 1984 which established that government had a 
fiduciary responsibility to safeguard Aboriginal interests and that First Nation's interest 
in land, both on reserve and outside reserves, was a "pre-existing legal right" not created 
by the Crown.37 This effectively quashed the idea that Aboriginal title was contingent on 
Crown recognition. 
The next critical policy event came with the addition of section 35 (1) into the 
Canadian Constitution in 1982, which provided Aboriginal and treaty rights recognition 
and Constitutional protection. Subsequent court cases such as Sparrow would test section 
35 and build onto the precedent set by the previous cases. These events served to firmly 
entrench Aboriginal issues onto the political agenda. Aboriginal people were finally 
experiencing some success in the courts and in the political system. Although the federal 
government had begun to rethink their policies, the British Columbia government would 
not strut to change their policies until the end of the 1980s. It would take several more 
critical court cases to allow Aboriginals more of a voice in provincial policy. In the late 
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1980s, industry and the public had also started to push both the provincial and federal 
governments to deal with the uncertainty created by the Aboriginal land question. 38 
During the early 1990s, some oil and gas companies began to lean toward 
including all the Aboriginal communities in northeast British Columbia into the industry 
more in terms of consultation, employment and contracting. This was as a result of 
several litigation efforts by First Nation communities against companies, delayed 
projects, adverse media coverage and a growing understanding that Aboriginals should 
have some influence or should be included in some way in the oil and gas decision 
making process. Neither the federal nor the provincial governments were willing to go 
that far. They would need more strident encouragement from subsequent legal decisions 
to change their policies. 
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The Policy Community Before 





Prior to the 1990s, before a series of events began to change the face of policy in 
British Columbia, First Nation groups had little or no influence on the policy arena and 
were not members of the oil and gas policy community. The policy community was 
dominated by the British Columbia government and by the oil and gas industry and was 
quite resistant to outside groups attempting to influence the process. First Nation 
concerns, mostly related to conflicting uses of the land, and resource rents were largely 
ignored by both the provincial and the federal government resulting in a veritable vacuum 
where little or no action was taken to resolve First Nation's concerns. It was left to some 
industry players to recognize that First Nation people should have some influence and 
decision making power in the process but the courts were the final impetus that led to 
legislational and policy changes. The next chapter will discuss those legal cases that 
were critical to affecting that change in British Columbia. 
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Chapter 3 Variables of Change 
Introduction 
Prior to the mid-1990s, First Nation peoples were not members of the oil and gas 
policy community in northeast British Columbia. Two critical variables changed that 
situation. The first was important legal decisions and the second was the Aboriginal 
platform of the newly elected NDP government and the policies they enacted as a result 
of.the legal decisions. 
This chapter will present four important legal cases and analyze their effect on 
natural resource development and Aboriginal people in British Columbia. The second 
part of the chapter outlines the pertinent policies the NDP government enacted and their 
effect on natural resources and First Nation peoples in the northeast area of British 
Columbia. 
Legal Cases 
Over the past decade, a number of legal decisions have made an indelible impact 
on the way that the British Columbia government deals with Aboriginal peoples and land 
and resource development. The court cases to be discussed in this chapter include R v. 
Sparrow (1990), Delgamuukw et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British 
Columbia and The Attorney General of Canada (1997), Halfway River First Nation v. 
British Columbia (1999) and Kelly Lake Cree v. British Columbia (1998). The British 
Columbia government has introduced policy in response to these decisions. The policy 
outlines the steps the government must take when dealing with Crown land and land 
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tenure where Aboriginal rights may exist. This policy creates a new role for government 
departments and industry, as they now must take responsibility to discern if Aboriginal 
rights exist and to what extent. The decisions also result in Aboriginal groups having 
more influence on policy; specifically this paper will focus on how the northeast First 
Nation communities became part of the sub-government or inner policy community 
concerning oil and gas development. Inquiries into legal questions, definitions and 
interpretations will be limited to specific issues that the British Columbia government has 
noted as part of its policy. 
Some of the important aspects of these decisions are to specify that Aboriginal 
rights and title were not extinguished with Confederation, as was previously argued by 
the government of British Columbia. The decisions resolved that under the 1982 
Constitution Act, section 35 (1) protects Aboriginal rights, and that any proposed 
government regulation that infringes on the exercise of Aboriginal rights must be 
constitutionally justified. Aboriginal people have priority to fish for food after 
conservation goals are met and Aboriginals have rights other than that of ownership over 
their traditional territories. Vacant Crown land is available for use by Aboriginal people 
for sustenance and ceremonial purposes until that land is to be used for other purposes. 
The provincial government cannot arbitrarily limit that use. The government must 
consult with Aboriginal people, prior to development to mitigate any possible Aboriginal 
rights infringement. Conversely, Aboriginal people also have a responsibility to consult 
meaningfully and in good faith with government. The first case to be discussed is the 




In the Sparrow case a Musqueam band member from British Columbia, Reginald 
Sparrow, " ... was found to have been fishing on 25 May 1984 in Canoe Passage with a 
drift net that was longer than had been permitted by the band's food fishing licence."1 
The licence was granted to the band under the British Columbia Fisheries Act. 2 The 
license stated that the drift net could not be longer than 25 fathoms. The defendant was 
caught with a net 45 fathoms in length.3 Sparrow was found guilty in provincial court. 
His defence was based on section 35 of the Constitution. This section recognizes and 
affirms existing Aboriginal and treaty rights.4 Sparrow conceded that the net violated 
regulations but he contended that he was exercising an existing Aboriginal right. The 
decision held when it was taken to county court. "The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
rendered an ambiguous decision: ... on the one hand they overturned the conviction 
because they found Sparrow's Aboriginal right to fish had not been extinguished prior to 
1982, on the other they limited the protection of section 35 so that the net restriction was 
not inconsistent with it."5 Both the Crown and Sparrow appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada ordered that a new trial be held. A new trial 
was not pursued. 
Sparrow appealed on the ground that the Court of Appeal erred in two respects. 
First, that section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982 only protects the Aboriginal right when 
exercised for the purpose of obtaining food and restricts those rights whenever 
"reasonably justified as being necessary for the proper management and conservation of 
the resource or in the public interest."6 Secondly, the appeal was based on the fact that 
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the court did not find the net restriction in the band's food fish licence inconsistent with 
section 35 of the Constitution Act 1982.7 
The Crown cross appealed on the ground that the court of Appeal erred in holding 
that the aboriginal right had not been extinguished before April 17, 1982, the date 
of commencement of the Constitution Act, 1982, and in particular in holding that, 
as a matter of fact and law, the appellant possessed the aboriginal right to fish for 
food. In the alternative, the respondent alleged, the Court of Appeal erred in its 
conclusions respecting the scope of the aboriginal right to fish for food and the 
extent to which it may be regulated, more particularly in holding that the 
aboriginal right included the right to take fish for the ceremonial purposes and 
societal needs of the Band and that the Band enjoyed a constitutionally protected 
priority over the rights of other people engaged in fishing. Section 35(1), the 
respondent maintained, did not invalidate legislation passed for the purpose of 
conservation and resource management, public health and safety and other 
overriding public interests such as the reasonable needs of other user groups. 8 
The court ruled that " ... the Constitution Act provides 'a strong measure of protection' 
for Aboriginal rights. Any proposed government regulations that infringe on the exercise 
of those rights must be constitutionally justified. It further ruled that 
• Aboriginal and treaty rights are capable of evolving over time and must be 
interpreted in a generous and liberal manner 
• governments may regulate existing Aboriginal rights only for a compelling and 
substantial objective such as the conservation and management of resources; and 
• after conservation goals are met, Aboriginal people must be given priority to 
fish for food over other user groups."9 
The court devised a test to determine if a regulation infringes on an Aboriginal right. The 




Is the limitation (or infringement) of the Aboriginal right reasonable? 
Does the limitation (or infringement) impose undue hardship? 
Does the limitation (or infringement) den6 the holders of the right their 
preferred means of exercising that right?1 
The court found that there was insufficient evidence to deal with the question of whether 
the net length restriction outlined in the fishing licence was inconsistent with section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. 11 
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The Sparrow ruling ascertains that Aboriginal rights were not extinguished by 
Confederation or by implicit actions of the British Columbia government. Prior to the 
ruling the British Columbia government had held that Aboriginal rights were 
extinguished with Confederation. This ruling has had a critical effect on the British 
Columbia government because it can no longer deny the existence of Aboriginal rights. 
Further, the Sparrow case was the first case in which the Supreme Court of Canada was 
called upon to interpret what section 35 of the Constitution Act really means. 12 The 
court ruled that the Constitution protects Aboriginal rights and that Aboriginal rights 
evolve over time and must be interpreted generously. 
The ruling also specifies that the provincial government cannot arbitrarily regulate 
Aboriginal rights. Regulation must be for compelling and substantive reasons and any 
regulations that limit Aboriginal rights must be justified. A test was established to 
ascertain justification of infringement. The test specifies that the infringement must be 
reasonable, it cannot result in undue hardship, and it cannot deny the Aboriginal people 
the preferred means of exercising that right. This effectively limits the ability of the 
provincial government to set regulations that may affect Aboriginal rights. This aspect 
of the ruling has probably had the most prevalent effect on natural resource development 
in the province. The province now must ensure regulations are for substantive and 
compelling reasons and that infringement of Aboriginal rights is minimized to the 
greatest extent possible. 
While this test appears to be restrictive on the ability of governments to regulate 
Aboriginal rights, it also " ... permits legislative infringement which is specially justified 
in individual cases."13 This parallels section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
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that while guaranteeing rights and freedoms asserts that those same rights and freedoms 
are subject to reasonable limits. When section 35(1) of the Constitution Act was enacted 
it was set outside the Charter and so section 1 of the Charter did not apply to section 
35(1). The justification test in Sparrow effectively mirrors section 1 of the Charter and 
applies specifically to section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. Frank Cassidy argues that 
although the provincial government is now constrained in its ability to set regulations that 
may limit Aboriginal rights " ... at the same time, it (the ruling) laid the foundation for a 
good measure of government control over these rights. Government ... may limit 
aboriginal rights when it has 'a valid legislative objective."14 
The decision also affirmed that Aboriginal peoples have priority to fish for food 
over other users. If the province reduces the fishing quotas for conservation reasons then 
that reduction must come off the non-Aboriginal, commercial fishing industries' catch. 
This directly impacts the commercial fishing industry and may affect the livelihood of 
non-Aboriginal fishing fleets. During the trial the " ... Attorneys General of British 
Columbia, Ontario, Quebec, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and Newfoundland supported the 
respondent (Province of British Columbia) as did the British Columbia Wildlife 
Federation ... the Fishery Council of British Columbia and the United Fishermen and 
Allied Workers Union."15 The other provinces and commercial fishery groups 
understood that this decision could effect their quota system and potentially their 
livelihood. 
As a result of the Sparrow decision, the question of whether Aboriginal rights 
exist is being decided on a case-by-case basis. The criterion by which government or 
indigenous people decide if Aboriginal rights do exist is vague. If there is any 
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disagreement the matter is decided by negotiation or in the courts. This is very expensive 
and time consuming and leaves both government and Aboriginals in uncertain positions. 
The questions that are raised are as follows: in which individual cases do Aboriginal 
rights exist, if they do exist are they being infringed and if they are, is that infringement 
justified? 
The next case to be discussed is Delgamuukw, one which affirms many of the 
tenets of Sparrow including the existence of Aboriginal rights. 
Delgamuukw et al. v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of British Columbia and The 
Attorney General of Canada 
The second case is commonly referred to as Delgamuukw. This decision has 
surely had more of an impact on Aboriginal rights and title and related government policy 
than any case in Canadian history. The Supreme Court of Canada rendered the decision 
in 1997. In 1984, 35 Gitksan and 13 Wet'suwet'en Hereditary Chiefs asked the British 
Columbia court to recognize their ownership of 57,000 square kilometres of land near 
Hazelton in northwest British Columbia, as well as their right to govern their traditional 
territories, and to receive compensation for loss of lands and resources. In 1991 the 
lower court ruled that the Crown had extinguished Aboriginal rights at the time of 
Confederation, however, the province had a legal obligation to permit Aboriginal 
sustenance activities on unoccupied Crown land until the land was dedicated to another 
purpose. The Chiefs appealed. The appeal court ruled that the Gitksan and 
Wet'suwet'en peoples do have "unextinguished non-exclusive aboriginal rights, other 
than a right of ownership" to much of their traditional territories. The justices strongly 
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recommended that the scope and content of those rights would best be defined through 
negotiation rather than litigation. 16 
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed to hear a further appeal from the Chiefs. 
Instead, the province and the Chiefs resolved to sit down and work towards treaty 
negotiations. An Accord of Recognition and Respect was signed on June 13, 1994. This 
accord meant that the two parties would, over the next year, attempt to come to terms 
through negotiation instead of litigation.17 In 1995, the negotiations began to break 
down and eventually the parties resumed litigation. Herb George, chief negotiator for the 
Wet'suwet'en people stated that the original intent of the court action was to encourage 
the province to negotiate with his people. 18 
A summary of the 1993 BC Supreme Court Delgamuukw decision is as follows: 
• Blanket extinguishment of Aboriginal rights did not occur prior to 1871 and 
therefore, these rights continue to exist in British Columbia today. 
• The Aboriginal people in question have unextinguished non-exclusive 
Aboriginal rights, other than a right of ownership, or a property right, in an area of 
Northern British Columbia specifically described by the Court of Appeal. 
• The Aboriginal people' s claim for jurisdiction was dismissed. 
• Aboriginal rights are those activities that are integral to the distinct culture of an 
Aboriginal society. They may vary from context to context in accordance with 
distinct patterns of historical occupancy and use of land. The activity must have 
been in existence prior to 1846, and for a sufficient length of time to become 
integral to the Aboriginal society. 
• As of 1982, existing Aboriginal rights were protected and continue to be so 
protected by Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act. 19 
The resultant Supreme Court of Canada (1997) decision is summarized as follows: 
• The questions of whether the Aboriginals possessed title to the lands in dispute and 
the issue of self-government were both sent back to trial. British Columbia was 
deemed to not have the power to extinguish Aboriginal rights and title after its 
admission into Confederation in 1871.20 
• Aboriginal title is a right in land, it confers the right to exclusive use and occupation 
of the land for a variety of activities including but not limited to Aboriginal rights. 
Aboriginal title is a collective right held by the community not by an individual. 
Decisions with respect to the land are made by the community.21 
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• Aboriginal title is different from other Aboriginal rights in that it arises " ... where the 
connection of a group with a piece of land was of a central significance to their 
distinctive culture." Aboriginal rights are activities whereas Aboriginal title is a right 
to the land itself?2 
• Existing Aboriginal rights and title are protected under section 35( 1) of the 
constitution. 23 
• The test for Aboriginal title is as follows i) the land must have been occupied prior to 
sovereignty, ii) if present occupation is relied on as proof of occupation pre-
sovereignty, there must be a continuity between present and pre-sovereignty 
occupation, and iii) at sovereignty, that occupation must have been exclusive.24 
• Aboriginal title land must be used in a way consistent with traditional Aboriginal uses 
and rights, the only way to use the land in an inconsistent manner would be to 
surrender those lands to the Crown and convert them into non-title lands. 
• There is always a duty to consult, this will vary from situation to situation and may be 
a simple discussion of important decisions in minor situations or actually require full 
consent in major situations. 
• Oral evidence of history, practice and occupation was allowed to be heard as evidence 
to establish Aboriginal title.25 
The importance of the Delgamuukw decision to Aboriginal rights and title is 
pervasive. Once again the Supreme Court ruled that Aboriginal rights were not 
extinguished in British Columbia by Confederation and so they continue to exist today. 
The court also declared that the province of British Columbia did not have the power to 
extinguish Aboriginal rights after Confederation. These two statements effectively 
dissolved the validity of the province's historic stance with regard to Aboriginal rights, 
namely, that the province had extinguished Aboriginal rights either explicitly with 
Confederation or implicitly by laws and actions since Confederation. Legally, British 
Columbia has to address unextinguished Aboriginal rights. 
Similar to the Sparrow case, the ruling also decreed that existing Aboriginal rights 
were protected and continue to be so by the Constitution Act of 1982. This means that 
any proposed government regulation that infringes on the exercise of Aboriginal rights 
must be constitutionally justified. 
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The ruling also established a duty to consult with regard to Aboriginal rights and title. 
This means that before government can proceed with development on Crown land they 
have a duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples regarding Aboriginal rights and in non-
treaty areas, Aboriginal title. The court indicated that the amount of consultation may 
vary resulting in full consent by Aboriginal people in some instances or perhaps require 
input on decision making in other situations. This requirement has changed the way the 
provincial government proceeds with development. Consultation adds a process into 
resource development decision-making that had not existed before. 
As often happens in case law, the initial cases may not clearly delineate the practical 
process of importa.11t principles discussed in the decisions. The element of consultation, 
given its crucial relationship to development, has since been tested and further enunciated 
by the courts. The following two cases look at consultation in northeast British 
Columbia. 
Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia 
The third case to be considered here is commonly referred to as Metecheah. 
Chief Bernie Metecheah is the leader of the Halfway River First Nation located in 
northeast British Columbia, approximately 100 kilometres northwest of Fort St. John. In 
1997 the judgment of the British Columbia Supreme Court effectively quashed a 
Canadian Forest Product's (Canfor) cutting permit in an area just south of the reserve, 
formerly approved by the British Columbia Ministry of Forests. The 1999 appeal 
supported that decision concurring that the Halfway peoples' treaty rights were infringed, 
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that the infringement was not shown to be justified by the Crown and that proper 
consultation procedures were not followed. 26 
The importance of this case is that it applies the Sparrow justification test for 
treaty and Aboriginal rights infringement and secondly that is sets out to discover, in this 
situation, how consultation regarding natural resource development should or should not 
proceed. 
The band argued that the area where Canfor was proposing to log was a 
traditional area within Treaty 8 where community members had traditionally practised 
their treaty and Aboriginal rights such as hunting, fishing, trapping, and gathering. The 
area is referred to as Tusdzuh and is just south of the reserve, close enough to the band so 
members could easily and often carry on traditional pursuits. The Ministry of Forests 
(MOF) and Canfor argued that the permit would still allow use of other areas of the 
Tusdzuh for traditional pursuits. The judge disputed this, stating this argument ignored 
the holistic perspective of the Halfway people as well as their preferred means of 
exercising their Aboriginal rights in an unspoiled area close to their reserve lands. The 
court cited that " .. . there is no persuasive evidence to suggest that other areas do not exist 
which Canfor could log in place of CP 212 (the permit area) to avoid interfering with 
Aboriginal rights."27 So not only was there found to be a prima facie or direct 
infringement of Aboriginal and treaty rights, there was also an infringement on the 
preferred means to practice those rights. 
The judge further found that the Crown failed to justify infringement of the treaty 
right because it failed in its duty to conduct " ... adequate, reasonable consultation ... "28 
with the band. Although consultation was pursued by MOF and Canfor in that numerous 
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letters were written, telephone calls made, meetings held, and feedback received there 
were situations where " ... reasonable opportunities to consult were denied to Halfway. "29 
These opportunities included denying Halfway the opportunity to meet with both MOF 
and Canfor, to review documents at an early timely stage, to review the actual permit 
application at a timely stage and more critically, for the British Columbia government to 
inform itself fully regarding Halfway and their practices and thus potential infringement 
on treaty and Aboriginal rights. All reasonable efforts were not made to consult and thus 
MOF did not meet its fiduciary obligations. 30 
In the appeal two of the higher court judges concurred with the trial judge saying 
that any interference with the right to hunt was a prima facie infringement on treaty 
rights; however they diverged from the lower court's decision that the preferred means 
related to a place (close to the reserve) but rather meant a method or mode of hunting and 
that the Tusdzuh was not 'unspoiled' as it had been subject to previous oil and gas and 
mining activity.31 The appeal judges went on to state that the legislative objectives of 
pursuing forestry development are sufficiently important to warrant infringement on 
treaty and Aboriginal rights as "those objectives include conservation, and the economic 
and cultural needs of all peoples and communities in the Province. "32 The appeal judges 
stated that the Crown must and actually did prove minimal infringement when in fact 
infringement was to occur. They also determined that the benefits from forestry to the 
province generally and in this case specifically, outweighed the detriment to the 
Aboriginals caused by the infringement to their right to hunt. 
On the question of consultation the judges stated: 
The Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably 
ensure that aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in a 
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timely way so that they have an opportunity to express their interests and 
concerns, and to ensure that their representations are seriously considered and, 
wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action. 
There is a reciprocal duty on aboriginal peoples to express their interests and 
concerns once they have an opportunity to consider the information provided ... 
and to consult in good faith by whatever means available to them. 33 
The Aboriginal people cannot refuse to consult or impose unreasonable conditions so as 
to frustrate the consultation process. The appeal judges found that the Crown did not 
provide information in a timely way to the Halfway that they would need in order to 
inform themselves of all the issues and secondly to ensure that Halfway had an 
opportunity to express their interests and concerns. 
The importance of this case is that it illustrates the provincial government's role 
to consult. The provincial government is ultimately responsible to consult with 
Aboriginal people regarding resource development. This is as a result of their fiduciary 
duty to Aboriginal peoples. 34 This duty requires that Aboriginal interests be respected 
and given priority, that consultation is necessary as a minimum with full consent 
possible, and that fair compensation may also be required. 35 The consultation in this 
case was deemed to be insufficient because not enough information was gathered by 
MOF to properly establish the rights of the community and the uses they made of the 
area. Also, the Halfway band was not given important information in a timely manner 
regarding the development plans. Thus the provincial government is responsible to 
ensure consultation is comprehensive, provides sufficient information to the community 
and gains sufficient information from the community to ascertain whether infringement 
will occur. 
The other aspect of the case that is critical is the fact that the justices deemed 
forestry and by ·extension other natural resource development including oil and gas, 
56 
'compelling and substantive' to the province and its people such that this type of activity 
warrants infringement on treaty or Aboriginal rights. This assumes the Sparrow test is 
applied, infringement is reasonable, does not cause undue hardship, nor denies the 
Aboriginal people the preferred means of practising that right. 
An interesting point one of the higher court justices illuminated in this case, was 
the question of who in government is qualified and responsible for ascertaining " ... the 
nature and scope of the treaty right at issue (and) whether the proposed use (of the land) 
is compatible with the treaty right".36 In this case the District Forest Manager was given 
this responsibility. The justice notes that a person in this position is no more qualified to 
make this type of decision than they (the justices) would be qualified to make technical 
forestry decisions. 37 This is an interesting statement and in future may certainly affect 
the validity of processes and outcomes associated with resource development and 
Aboriginal and treaty right decisions. 
Kelly Lake Cree v. British Columbia 
The last case to be discussed is commonly called Amoco. In 1998, the British 
Columbia Supreme Court heard evidence from the Saulteau First Nation and the Kelly 
Lake Cree Nation asking it to review decisions made by the Ministry of Energy and 
Mines to approve a license for Amoco Canada to drill a well near Mount Montieth in 
northeastern British Columbia and for the Ministry of Forests to grant a cutting permit to 
Amoco for the same purpose. The two communities asked that the permits be set aside 
and that the respective ministries resume consultation regarding the proposed 
development with the communities as meaningful consultation had not occurred. Mount 
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Montieth is one of the locally named 'Twin Sisters', two mountains that the Saulteau and 
Beaver people consider to be sacred. 
The court denied the application to set aside the permits on all assertions. They 
found that adequate and meaningful consultation had occurred over a period from 1992 
until the permit was issued in July of 1998. Both the provincial government and Amoco 
consulted with the First Nation communities. Two other First Nation communities that 
were participants were ··satisfied with the consultation and indicated such in written 
correspondence. The judge asserted that in the case of the Kelly Lake Cree Nation, 
... there was no duty to consult with the KLCN given the remoteness of the KLCN 
to the area in question and the claims of the (Saulteau First Nation, West Moberly 
First Nation) and the Halfway First Nation. However given the lack of response 
to the ... correspondence ... even if the Crown had a duty to consult...that obligation 
was fulfilled when KLCN .. .failed to express any interest in the proposed Montieth 
Mountain Project. 38 
Similarly, regarding the Saulteau First Nation claim for lack of meaningful consultation, 
the judge dismissed the claim saying that II • •• consultation is a two way process ... 11 and the 
Saulteau seemed implacable in their opposition to any development in the area.39 It is the 
process of consultation and consideration of such issues and not a power of veto that is 
required.40 Thus, the courts have said that 'meaningful consultation' is a two way 
process which does not give the Aboriginal party the power to veto development however 
they must be able to express their interests and ensure their concerns are seriously 
considered and where possible integrated into the proposed development. 
As was the case with the Metecheah decision, the significance of this case is the 
scope and content of consultation: what constitutes 'enough meaningful' consultation; 
who is to be consulted; as well as the role all parties, government, industry, and 
Aboriginal groups must play during such a process. The provincial government took a 
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lead role in consultations in this case. The justice decreed that sufficient consultation 
took place and that Aboriginal parties must also engage in meaningful consultation and 
cannot stall the process by not participating. Not all Aboriginal groups have the right to 
participate in decision making on all projects, only those who can prove they have an 
interest in the area. 
As with the Metecheah case, this case also raised the question of who in 
government is qualified and responsible to decide about the nature and scope of the 
Aboriginal rights and the efficacy of the process. The justice decided that the director 
who made the decision was capable even though he had not actively been involved in the 
consultation process. The director based his decision on the reams of information that 
had been generated from meetings, studies, discussions, etc. and so had access to 
sufficient information. 
Both the Metecheah and Amoco cases were brought against the provincial 
government as the primary defendant and the resource development companies as the 
secondary defendant. Prior to Metecheah, the practice in British Columbia was to have 
industry consult with Aboriginal communities. Other important cases such as Guerin v. 
R have established government as having a fiduciary responsibility towards Aboriginal 
people. As such the courts now recognize government as the entity that must consult on 
rights and infringement issues. Industry has continued to consult on technical, 
employment and mitigation issues. 
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Conclusion -Legal Cases 
The Sparrow and Delgamuukw decisions in particular have clearly resulted in a 
change in how Aboriginal rights are perceived. These decisions now specify that 
Aboriginal rights and title were not extinguished by Confederation as the British 
Columbia government had previously asserted. They also specify that the British 
Columbia government did not have the power to extinguish Aboriginal rights and title 
after its admission into Confederation. This effectively eliminated a policy that the 
British Columbia government had adhered to for well over 100 years. The onus is now 
on government to ascertain if Aboriginal rights exist and to ensure that those rights are 
not adversely affected by development. If the rights are infringed then government must 
minimize the infringement and justify why that infringement is necessary. This reaffirms 
the provincial government's rights to legislate and control activity within the province 
subject to Aboriginal people's rights. 
The outcome is that the natural resource regulatory process within the province 
had to change, as the government must now ascertain if infringement of Aboriginal rights 
is occurring and act accordingly. Commercial fishing operations are affected by the 
Aboriginal right to have priority to fish for food. Consultation by government must be 
thorough to establish what rights and potential infringement exist. 
Once the courts handed down these decisions, the British Columbia government 
chose to change some of its current Aboriginal policies. Several of these new policies 




The British Columbia NDP government has reacted relatively swiftly to the 
Sparrow, Delgamuukw, and Metecheah legal decisions. They have enacted legislation 
regarding natural resource development on Crown land. They have made critical changes 
to the strategy around the Delgamuukw court case itself and they have implemented new 
legislation and policies in the oil and gas sector that bring the First Nation groups in 
northeast British Columbia into the policy community. As important as these court 
decisions are, they do not exhaust the causal factors explaining the changes in 
government policy. To court cases, we must add the ideological changes in government 
ushered in with the election of the NDP in 1991. This chapter now presents an overview 
of the NDP policy both prior to and after their 1991 election win, as it pertains to First 
Nation issues. 
Pre-election Policies of the Party 
At the 1990 New Democratic Convention held in Vancouver in March the 
following Aboriginal Land Claims Policy was accepted: 
The New Democratic Party believes that resolution of the Indian Land Question 
in British Columbia is a critical political, economic and moral issue that can no 
longer be ignored. A just and honourable settlement of the Land Question is vital 
if we are to achieve sustainable economic development for the province as a 
whole. Toward this end, the New Democratic Party is committed to: 
1. recognition of Aboriginal title and Aboriginal peoples' inherent right to self-
government; 
2. provincial participation in modem-day treaty negotiations to achieve a just and 
honourable settlement of the land question; 
3. third-party interest in negotiated treaties on the land question; 
4. sustainable economic development initiatives in both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal communities resulting from settlement of the land question; 
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5. Renewal of constitutional processes aimed at entrenching Aboriginal peoples' 
inherent right to self-government in the Constitution of Canada.41 
This was new for the NDP as their 1972-5 government, of which Frank Calder 
was a minister, held views similar to those of the Socred Government held up until1990. 
Both governments refused to participate in treaty negotiations. They tried to assert that 
British Sovereignty had implicitly extinguished Aboriginal title.42 Frank Calder was a 
member of the Nisga'a nation and involved in the important Calder case that was the first 
time the Supreme Court justices "recognized Aboriginal title as a legal right derived from 
the Indians' historic occupation and possession of their tribal lands. "43 The Supreme 
Court justices were divided however on whether that title had been extinguished.44 
The Socred government, under Premier Vander Zalm, also changed their policy 
dramatically from their historic stance that Aboriginal title had been extinguished prior to 
British Columbia joining confederation. They formally joined the ongoing Nisga'a 
negotiations; created a Premier's Council on Native Affairs that presented a report on 
Aboriginal issues; created a provincial Land Claims Registry office; and created a 
provincial Land Claims Negotiation Office to further assist the federal government.45 
However, in their 1991 election platform the Socreds, under Premier Rita Johnston, drew 
the line at mirroring the NDP's platform. The Socreds stated that they would not 
recognize Aboriginal title as a precondition for treaty negotiations or the inherent right to 
self-government. They also disagreed with the NDP promise to negotiate treaties that 
provide " .. .innovative resource and habitat management regimes that benefit all British 
Columbians." The Socreds pointed to the Ontario NDP who had a similar platform and 
whose policies resulted in unfair access to lands and resources by Aboriginal people.46 
The major difference between the two parties' views on Aboriginal policy was in regard 
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to natural resource management and control. Both parties agreed to try and resolve 
outstanding treaty claims but while the Socreds would not include Aboriginal control 
over natural resource development the NDP advocated innovative resource management 
regimes which included Aboriginal participation. 
Both of these provincial parties recognized that changes to policy and current 
legislation had to occur. This was largely as a result of civil unrest by Aboriginal groups 
across the country including the stand-off at Oka and numerous road blocks and actions 
by British Columbia Aboriginal groups.47 Industrial development was at risk because of 
the uncertainty created by various interpretations of the legal decisions, Aboriginal 
demands, and resultant civil unrest. Both parties reacted with very different platforms to 
try and deal with the Aboriginals' unresolved and largely ignored issues. With the 1991 
election win, the NDP had the opportunity to put their platform into action. Given the 
unresolved Aboriginal issues and tension surrounding some of the recent events there was 
an expectancy with the incoming NDP government and their Aboriginal platform. 
Claudia Notzke sums up the anticipation: 
. .. British Columbia's First Nations find themselves on the threshold of a new 
relationship with mainstream society. The provincial government's 1990 
decision to acknowledge the validity of comprehensive aboriginal claims and 
the rise to power of the New Democrats the following year set the stage for a 
redefinition of the relationship not only between the province's Indian people 
and government, but also between native people and industry.48 
Post-Election Policies ofthe Party 
In the speeches from the throne from 1992 to 1996, the governing NDP party 
platform promised to address Aboriginal concerns. The following are some excerpts 
from those speeches. 
63 
1992 We recognize Aboriginal title and the inherent right of Aboriginal people 
to self-government. An agreement to establish a new Treaty Commission has 
been negotiated, and we are pleased it has received the approval of this 
government and the First Nations Summit Chiefs. 
This government is committed to negotiation to settle issues with Aboriginal 
people. We are working to support initiatives to encourage self-sufficiency in 
Aboriginal communities while developing joint stewardship arrangements with 
First Nations to provide for cooperation on the management of resources prior to 
treaty negotiations. The third party consultation process is being strengthened to 
ensure all interests are heard and considered. 49 
1993 British Columbia will take another historic step this Session. This 
government will introduce the Treaty Commission Act to enable the negotiation 
of modem treaties with Aboriginal peoples to proceed. Fair and just settlements 
with First Nations will not only provide greater economic certainty but also, more 
importantly, mean new economic opportunities for Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal peoples. 
This government has moved to formalize our responsibility to represent third 
party interests at the negotiating table and to establish a cost-sharing arrangement 
with the federal government which is fair to B.C. taxpayers. 50 
1994 Land-use disputes must be settled in a fair and timely manner to protect 
jobs, our environment and treaty negotiations with First Nations .. .In addition, this 
government will build on the significant policy initiatives and positive changes 
introduced in the legislative sessions of the past two years (to) ... forge a new 
relationship with Aboriginal peoples. 51 
1996 ... the past year has also seen important advances- and none more 
fundamental to the destiny of this province than the initial steps toward British 
Columbia's first modem-day Aboriginal treaty. And in the coming year, my 
government will work toward concluding a formal agreement with the Nisga'a 
1 52 peop e ... 
Promises to work on other aspects of Aboriginal life were also included such as 
employment equity, social and family services, cultural and heritage protection, and 
protection of the salmon. Some of these promises resulted in enacted legislation and 
policy. The following section will explore the policies and legislation specifically 
affecting the oil and gas industry. 
One of the early actions taken by the NDP government is surprising and perhaps 
gives a clue as to their future policy direction. The Delgamuukw case had started in 1984 
with judgment by the lower court judge handed down in 1991. The judge had basically 
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denied the Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en their claims of ownership, self-government and 
compensation. Thi.s was seen as a victory for British Columbia. The Socred government 
promised to continue negotiating despite the trial's outcome. When the NDP came to 
power they switched counsel for the upcoming appeal case. That is, they fired the team 
that had won the case in the lower courts and hired a new team of lawyers who had 
worked with Aboriginal people in land use disputes. These lawyers were seen as 
sympathetic to Aboriginal claims. Melvin Smith asserts that the NDP government was 
looking for judicial support for their Aboriginal platform. In response, the court took an 
unusual step and had the previous team of lawyers, who had successfully defended the 
lower court case, appointed as "friends of the court". 53 Such an action by a provincial 
government is very unusual, especially in a province where treaties have yet to be settled 
and where settlement will likely carry a heavy cost. This action is suggestive of a 
governing regime that wants to speed up implementation of their Aboriginal policy and 
perhaps is looking for support for a radically different policy. The NDP's policy 
response was indeed a radical change. 
Crown Lands Policy 
In response to the legal cases and in line with their platform, the NDP government 
implemented a new Crown lands policy in 1995 titled 'Crown Land Activities and 
Aboriginal Rights and Policy Framework'. This policy dealt with all types of resource 
development activity on Crown lands, including oil and gas development, and provided a 
guide for the bureaucracy and industry as to how to deal with possible Aboriginal 
interests. The policy statement or basic precept of this document is as follows: "The 
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provincial government will endeavour to make its best efforts to avoid any infringement 
of known Aboriginal rights during the conduct of its business." 54 The province proposed 
to do this by following these steps: to establish if Aboriginal rights exist through 
consultation or other available information, to determine if the action would infringe on 
that right, to resolve matters of conflicting interest by negotiation, to attempt to justify the 
infringement if it cannot be avoided. 55 This policy was based specifically on the 
Sparrow and Delgamuukw appeal cases. This was a sharp policy adjustment for the 
province of British Columbia. 
This Crown land policy was the first step toward bringing Aboriginals into the 
policy community. Through consultation the Aboriginal groups were given information 
directly about activity that was planned on their traditional lands. Prior to this policy 
Aboriginal people seldom knew if development was planned in their areas. They usually 
found out about development by actually witnessing it or by being hired onto a labour 
crew. This new process allowed them to begin negotiating provisions around access to 
the land, employment, community development, heritage protection, and in some cases 
compensation. Industry realized that they must now deal directly with Aboriginal 
communities and respond to their queries and demands. 
Although this was a Crown lands policy aimed at bureaucrats and permit 
providers, industry in the oil and gas sector had to take on the role of consultation. This 
was an unfamiliar role to them in two ways. First, most companies had seldom dealt with 
Aboriginal communities, although there were some companies that had started consulting 
on their own initiative and involving the communities in projects and employment. 
Second, companies were used to notification as opposed to consultation. The courts in 
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Comparison of NDP and Socred Policies Relative to Important Court Decisions 
Important Court British Columbia Party Policy 
Decisions 
Dates NDP Soc reds 
1989 1. Joined Nisga'a 
negotiations 
2. Created Premier's council 
on Native Affairs 
3. Created Land Claims 
Registry 
4. Created Land Claims 
negotiation office 
1990 1. Recognition of Aboriginal title & 
Sparrow Decision Aboriginal people's inherent right to self-
government 
2. Provincial participation in modem day 
treaty negotiations 
3. Third-party interest in negotiated treaties 
4. Sustainable economic development in 
both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities resulting from settlement of 
the land question. 
5. Renewal of constitutional processes to 
entrench Aboriginal peoples' inherent 
right to self-govemement in the Canadian 
Constitution. 
1991 1. Refused to recognize 
Delgamuukw British Aboriginal title as a 
Columbia Court Decision precondition to treaty 
negotiations 
1994 
Delgamuukw BC Supreme 
Court Decision 
1995 
Crown Lands Policy enacted 
Oil and Gas Handbook Policy enacted 
1997 





1998 Oil and Gas Commission created 
Amoco decision 
1999 
Halfway BC Supreme 
Court Decision 
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the Sparrow and Delgamuukw Appeal cases did not define consultation. So it has been 
and still continues to be a vague and difficult concept to understand and execute. 
Conclusion 
The policy of the NDP prior to their winning the 1991 election clearly indicated 
that they intended to try to address Aboriginal issues in a meaningful way. The policy 
and legislation enacted by the NDP subsequent to 1991 clearly shows a trend toward 
implementation of their policies. The legislation around natural resource development in 
particular also clearly responds to important legal decisions, including Sparrow and 
Delgamuukw. 
These policies and legislation were a radical change from those of the previous 
government of British Columbia. They changed the way natural resource development 
and decision-making occurred in the province. Other provincial governments did not 
respond to the legal decisions in the same manner. The legislation and policies resulted 
because of the NDP policy and because of the legal decisions. 
The next chapter will look at two final legislative changes that brought First 
Nation communities in northeast British Columbia into the policy community, the Oil 
and Gas Handbook, a compilation of oil and gas regulations, legislation and policy and 
the Oil and Gas Commission, a regulatory agency overseeing the development of oil and 
gas in the province. 
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Chapter4 Actual Changes in Policy 
The NDP government in British Columbia has enacted a Crown lands policy 
affecting natural resource development that now requires provincial government 
ministries, agencies and industry to make best efforts to avoid infringement of Aboriginal 
rights. This policy resulted from two critical variables: important court cases and NDP 
government policy discussed in the last chapter. The Crown lands policy plus policies 
specifically relevant to the oil and gas sector have resulted in dramatic changes to the 
policy community in the oil and gas industry. This chapter looks at two policies 
specifically dealing with this sector and the effect these policy changes have had on the 
policy community and the actors that are now a part of that policy community. 
Oil and Gas Handbook 
An important policy that the NDP government enacted in November of 1995 was 
specifically aimed at the oil and gas industry. This policy was released shortly after the 
Crown lands policy was introduced. It centralized pertinent information about the 
petroleum industry within one document titled the British Columbia Oil and Gas 
Handbook (Handbook). The Handbook was designed as a tool for industry to use when 
planning and conducting activity in British Columbia.1 Section 3.5 outlined First Nation 
considerations including avoiding infringement of Aboriginal rights and guidelines on 
how to conduct consultation with First Nations. 2 
Within the introductory section entitled Regulatory Framework, the Handbook 
clearly states that the Delgamuukw appeal decision "changed the nature of the legal 
relationship between the province and First Nations"3 It went further to state that the 
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government of British Columbia was responsible to determine if Aboriginal rights exist 
and if those rights might be unjustifiably infringed. The section defines what Aboriginal 
rights are and states that they may exist in traditional territories adjacent to reserves as 
well as on reserves. The Handbook required industry to consult with First Nations to 
gather information the Ministry may need to make a decision with regard to infringement 
of treaty and Aboriginal rights. 4 At this time industry including CAPP, the provincial 
government and a number of First Nation communities in northeast British Columbia 
were in negotiations to draft consultation guidelines that were mutually acceptable to all 
parties.5 Those consultation guidelines were never completed. 
The Oil and Gas Handbook was used by the provincial government and by 
industry for several years but the consultation process with First Nation communities was 
not clear and was not an easy process for industry to implement. Each community 
established a different process for consultation that resulted in considerable extra time 
and expense for industry to complete the application process. The Commission was 
created to try and address some of these problems and to streamline the consultation and 
application process. 
Oil and Gas Commission 
The creation of the Oil and Gas Commission is the final legislative change to be 
discussed. It is important because its creation was an acknowledgement by the provincial 
government in Victoria of the importance of the industry in the northeast to the provincial 
economy. More importantly for the purposes set out herein, during the creation of the 
Commission, the province recognized the potential affect that oil and gas development 
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can have on Aboriginal and treaty rights. The provincial government attempted to deal 
with that potential through Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) signed with the 
individual First Nation communities, thus formally bringing the First Nations into the 
policy community. 
The Commission was formally established and opened for business in October of 
1998 after a very brief incubation and development stage of about 10 months. 6 The 
policy objectives behind the creation of the Commission were to increase production and 
related industrial activity by reducing oil and gas levies and simplifying the approval 
process for the oil and gas industry. These simplification and consolidation initiatives 
were not to be accomplished at the expense of environmental standards or of the 
provincial government's responsibility toward Aboriginal people. 7 First Nation 
representatives were consulted during negotiations leading up to the establishment of the 
Commission. It was during the creation and implementation of this legislation that 
northeast First Nation communities finally achieved their current status within the policy 
community in oil and gas development. 
The First Nation communities and industry were both consulted regarding the 
establishment of the Commission as the provincial government held bilateral negotiations 
with both parties. Industry ultimately agreed to fund the operation of the Commission 
through user fees. Those fees are considerably higher than the previous fees industry was 
required to remit under the old provincial application process. A portion of the user fees 
was to go toward assisting the First Nation communities during the formal consultation 
process that was established. This included providing capacity funding for the First 
Nations to hire staff and to assist with the newly developed consultation process. Under 
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this process, the provincial government agreed to undertake consultation regarding 
possible infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights. This was a change; up to this 
point, industry had been required to consult with the First Nation communities. The 
former consultation process was a haphazard process fraught with inconsistencies and 
uncertainties. The MOUs were designed to make the process consistent in all the First 
Nation communities and to set out time periods and parameters under which all parties 
would operate. These were welcome changes from industries' standpoint. It was willing 
to pay more to see this happen and accord First Nations more influence in policy. First 
Nations in northeast British Columbia now have a direct voice in oil and gas 
development, more so than any other stakeholder group in the area or the province. 
The new Commission consultation process has industry apply to the Commission 
and the Commission distribute the entire application to the Treaty 8 First Nation 
communities. The communities then have set time periods in which to reply back to the 
Commission with any concerns, information, or mitigation strategies. Industry is still 
expected to discuss specific project details with the communities relating to timing of the 
development, potential employment, contracting opportunities, and so on. As a result 
there are two levels of consultation. One level is consultation between the province and 
the First Nation regarding possible infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights, the other 
is between industry and the First Nation regarding the economic and social effects of the 
project on the area and on the communities. 
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The Policy Community Before 




The Policy Community After 




How These Policies Have Changed the Policy Community 
These new policies have changed the policy community by introducing a new 
actor into the sub-government. The provincial government and industry were the main 
actors within the sub-government and now the First Nation communities in the northeast 
are also members of the sub-government. Prior to 1990 the British Columbia 
government would not acknowledge Aboriginal rights or Aboriginal title and was reticent 
to deal with long-standing issues that had been articulated by Aboriginal people in the 
province since before Confederation. The British Columbia government had argued that 
Aboriginal rights and title had been extinguished. Various events served to change the 
government's stance on these issues. They include a combination of early court cases 
which the provincial government did not react to such as the Calder case, the Constitution 
Act of 1992 and then ultimately the Sparrow and Delgamuukw cases combined with the 
election of an NDP government that promised to put Aboriginal issues on the agenda and 
work to resolve those issues. The result has been that the First Nation communities in 
northeast British Columbia have become members of the oil and gas policy community 
and the subsequent policies passed by the NDP government have had an effect on all the 
players within the policy community, especially industry and First Nations. 
The First Nation communities in the northeast have been affected by the changes 
as they have become signators to an MOU that has given them a documented consultation 
policy, funding to build capacity within the community and to properly consult on 
applications and a mechanism to give input to the government on the operation of the 
Commission and oil and gas policy generally. These are some of the goals First Nations 
in the region have been working toward. During the early 1990s when community 
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members worked with the Northeast Industry group discussed in Chapter Two, they 
looked for some of these results. At that time the provincial government was unwilling to 
consider such policies. The MOU is a bi-lateral agreement between the individual First 
Nations and the provincial government dealing with oil and gas issues. Signing an 
agreement of this type is a goal the communities have worked toward for a very long 
time. 
The consultation policy in itself is probably the biggest coup for the First Nation 
communities. They now receive applications for all proposed activity within a prescribed 
activity area and are given time and resources to review the applications. In the fiscal 
year 1999/2000 each First Nation community received $612,827 for capacity funding. 8 
This is a critical aspect of the consultation and MOU process as prior to 1998 any funding 
they received was from the companies that were willing to pay fees to get the community 
to review the applications. 9 Prior to 1995 there was no specific funding available and 
little capacity within the communities to look at issues as broad as land use or to 
comment on sector-type activity like oil and gas proposals. Now under the MOUs they 
receive funding and are included in the consultation process on all oil and gas 
applications. A further example is that most communities now have staff to review the oil 
and gas applications. Some have hired personnel from outside the community while 
others have hired community members. 10 
The First Nation communities are also consulted by the government on 
Commission policy and asked to review overall policy initiatives for oil and gas 
development. They have become an important core stakeholder for oil and gas policy. 
This is a coveted position toward which they have long worked. 
78 
Within the Commission there exists an entire department dedicated to Aboriginal 
issues. The Aboriginal Relations and Land Use branch of the Commission is staffed with 
some local Aboriginal people and others who work with the communities to ensure they 
receive the application information in a timely manner and have an opportunity within 
the MOU timeframe to give feedback to the Commission on community uses and 
concerns about development of the land. The Aboriginal department also works with the 
communities to resolve 'other issues or concerns not specifically related to applications. 
For.instance, the department assists in organizing an annual gathering where industry, 
government and Aboriginal people can come together and understand each other better 
and celebrate Aboriginal culture. The branch has three Senior Aboriginal Program 
Specialists and four Aboriginal Liaison Communication Officers dedicated to working 
with the communities to resolve land use issues. The branch also has administrative staff 
and the Director who deal with Aboriginal issues. 11 
The provincial government's role has also changed as they have now accepted 
responsibility to consult with First Nation communities on infringement of treaty and 
Aboriginal rights. They no longer ask industry to consult; they consult directly with the 
communities. They have signed an MOU with the First Nation bands and have 
negotiated with industry to provide funding for the bands for capacity and economic 
development. The have set up the Commission to address Aboriginal and other issues 
and have staffed an entire department to deal with Aboriginal issues. The government 
has firmly accepted some of the Sparrow and Delgamuukw findings and incorporated 
them into broad policies such as the Crown lands policy as well as sector specific policies 
such as Commission policies. Both the legal findings and policies have changed the way 
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the provincial government does business and changed the way they interact with the First 
Nation people in the northeast area of the province. The initial MOUs were signed in 
1998. In early 2001 the provincial government renegotiated the MOUs with four of the 
communities. 12 Some fundamental changes to the original MOU has been made as 
suggested by both parties. For example, the financial contribution will be calculated 
using a different formula. 
Industry has been affected by the changes in a number of ways. They are no 
longer required to consult with the First Nation communities regarding infringement of 
treaty and Aboriginal rights. The government now consults directly with the First 
Nation. Industry is still expected to work with communities on mitigation strategies, on 
timing of development and on economic development opportunities. Industry is now 
required to pay substantially more for application fees as a certain amount of the fees 
goes to the communities to assist them with consulting on the applications. For example 
industry now pays $8,400 to file an application to drill a well. They paid approximately 
$400 in 1997 for a well application. As of April!, 2001 under the renegotiated MOUs, 
$4,931 per well goes directly to the communities for capacity funding. 13 
Industry wanted the First Nation communities included in the Commission 
regulatory process so that it provided a structured consultation process including setting a 
time limit for application review, setting consistent fees and requiring consistent 
information. They were willing to pay more to ensure this occurred. First Nation issues 
are now acknowledged and dealt with by both the provincial government and the industry 
companies, unlike the early part of the 1990s when some companies were willing to try to 
work with the communities on issues and the province was not. 
80 
The policy community now provides all three actors an arena in which to 
negotiate and try to resolve issues. Prior to First Nation's entry into the policy 
community the only way they could have significant input was by using the judicial 
system. Although that system eventually granted them access to the policy community it 
provides win-lose results. It is time consuming, costly and the results are not always 
consistent or what any of the actors really want. For instance the Delgamuukw case 
began in 1984 and the Supreme Court decision was handed down in December of 1997 at 
a cost of millions of dollars by all parties involved. The Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en 
people were ultimately looking for recognition of ownership of their traditional lands, 
that question was sent back for retrial by the Supreme Court justices and has never been 
resolved. As Herb George, negotiator for the Gitksan indicated, the use of the courts 
was simply a means to get the provincial government to negotiate with the First Nation 
groups, it was not seen as providing the answer the First Nation people were seeking. 
Indeed it has not provided the answer, for the parties are still negotiating treaties which 
includes multiple aspects such as resource management and sharing the material benefits 
of natural resource development. The justices in the 1993 Delgamuukw judgment 
strongly encouraged the parties to negotiate rather than litigate, recognizing that the 
courts are not the optimum place to define the scope and content of long-term 
agreements. 
Conclusion 
The new policies of the British Columbia NDP have resulted in Treaty 8 First 
Nation people within the northeast area of the province achieving considerable influence 
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within the oil and gas policy community. The NDP government responded to significant 
legal decisions by developing policies that incorporate some of the important outcomes of 
those decisions. They then totally revamped the regime for approving oil and gas 
applications and placed the First Nation communities firmly within that regulatory 
structure. Prior to the NDP coming to power the First Nation communities had little 
influence on oil and gas policy. Within the MOUs they are consulted at a policy and a 




1. British Columbia Ministry of Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources. British 
Columbia Oil and Gas Handbook, (November 1995): 1: section 1.1 . 
2. Ibid., 1: section 3.5. 
3. Ibid., 3: section 2.1.5. 
4. Ibid. , 1: Attachment 3-4 Consultation Steps. 
5. Ibid., 1: section 3.5.2.1. 
6. Murray Rankin, Sandy Carpenter, Patricia Burchmore and Christopher Jones, 
'Regulatory Reform in the British Columbia Petroleum Industry: the Oil and Gas 
Commission' Alberta Law Review Vol38, No 1 (June 2000): 144. 
7. Ibid., 145-146. 
8. Oil and Gas Commission 'Financial Information Act Report for the Year Ended 
March 31, 2000', 20. 
Note: Under the 1998 MOU between the Province of British Columbia and Member 
First Nations of Treaty 8: Blueberry River, Doig River, Prophet River, and Saulteau 
First Nations www.ogc.gov.bc.caldocuments/firstnations/mou/t8ta-a3htm $235,675 
was specifically earmarked for capacity to hire staff and set up an office. The 
remaining came from contributions from development activities. For instance for 
every well drilled the First Nations received $3,000 and 1,000 per year thereafter until 
a certificate of restoration is received. 
9. Some companies had agreements with First Nation communities that specified 
payment of fees per application for review or general funding to review applications. 
For instance the Blueberry First Nation had agreements with several companies 
including Suncor Energy. 
10. As of January 2001, all the First Nation communities except one have at least one 
staff person to review applications. 
11. Oil and Gas Commission, 'Aboriginal and Land Use Branch Directory', 
www .ogc. bc.calphonelist.aso#abrel. 
12. Presentation to CAPP by MEM officials April2001. Note: Doig River, Saulteau and 
Fort Nelson First Nations have opted out of the MOUs last year, they have not 




Prior to 1990, no British Columbia government had recognized Aboriginal title or 
Aboriginal rights. The 1991 NDP government was the first government to change that 
aspect of Aboriginal history within the province and in essence, to begin the process to 
re-enfranchise a people that had been disenfranchised for a very long period of time. 
That recognition did not automatically result in significant changes to the day-to-day life 
of Aboriginal people. Instead it was the beginning of a series of profound policy changes 
that began by granting Aboriginal people more influence in policy and regulatory 
decision-making in natural resource development. These policies are based on important 
court decisions that have defined Aboriginal rights and defined how those rights must be 
considered by governments. 
What has changed for First Nation people in northeast British Columbia is their 
role in policy and regulation of the oil and gas industry. Prior to 1995, when the Crown 
lands policy was introduced, the First Nation communities in the area did not have any 
input into the development of oil and gas resources on lands they traditionally used for 
hunting, fishing, trapping and gathering. They did not have any influence in how such 
activity would affect their treaty and Aboriginal rights. The provincial government 
changed that with the introduction of the Crown lands policy by instituting a consultation 
requirement that would apply the Sparrow test for rights and title infringement. Now for 
the first time Aboriginal people across the province have to be consulted when lands they 
used for traditional pursuits might be affected by development. 
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The implementation of the Oil and Gas Commission in 1998 further changed the 
relationship between First Nations in the northeast, the provincial government and the oil 
and gas industry. The First Nations communities signed MOUs with the provincial 
government that provided funding for consultation, a process for their input into 
development decisions and input into policy around oil and gas development. These are 
dramatic changes for First Nation communities that have repeatedly tried to gain 
influence over development decisions but up until 1995 had been unsuccessful. 
Chapter One dealt with the Clayoquot Sound case and the need for further 
examples of cases where Aboriginal peoples have meaningful input into resource 
management and development in treaty areas as well as in non-treaty areas. The case of 
First Nation communities in the oil and gas sector in northeast British Columbia is 
instructive when compared to the Clayoquot Sound case. First, the First Nations in the 
northeast did not achieve co-management as did the Clayoquot Sound Aboriginals, 
however they achieved a place in the policy community and are considerably more 
influential than they were prior to implementation of the Crown lands policy in 1995 and 
subsequent Commission policy. The First Nation communities in the northeast now have 
bi-lateral agreements with the provincial government, are consistently consulted on oil 
and gas development applications and have recourse in the oil and gas policy and 
regulatory arenas in the event of disagreements or disputes. 
Second, in the Clayoquot Sound case the authors discussed the idea of policy 
intersection occurring between the forestry policy community and the Aboriginal policy 
community. In the oil and gas sector case the .policy community intersection occurred 
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when the Crown lands policy was implemented. Thus the policy intersection actually 
occurred across all natural resource policy sectors including oil and gas and forestry. 
Third, the Clayoquot Sound case involved a non-treaty First Nation entering the 
policy community. As was discussed in Chapter One this is not uncommon, for the non-
treaty First Nations have unextinguished Aboriginal title and so in a sense they have 
additional leverage with which to negotiate co-management type agreements that provide 
them more control over resource development. Often they are in negotiations with a 
provinciaVterritorial government and the federal government and so have a forum to 
address land use and management issues. In the oil and gas case, the First Nation 
communities are members of Treaty 8 and as the literature review illustrated there are 
few cases where treaty First Nations are provided the opportunity to engage in resource 
management agreements. Governments, whether they be federal or provincial are 
reluctant to engage in negotiations of this type with First Nation groups that have already 
surrendered Aboriginal title under the terms of a treaty. 
Finally, the Clayoquot Sound case resulted in co-management where the First 
Nation group gained additional control over development of the resource including a joint 
venture with the forestry company. This moved them from a non-productive actor that 
does not receive material benefits to a productive actor that does benefit financially from 
development. The First Nation communities in the northeast remain non-productive 
actors that do not benefit directly from oil and gas development off reserve in the 
northeast, except from whatever employment they can gain. 1 
The oil and gas case provides a unique situation where both industry and 
government have agreed to accept another actor into the sub-government sphere of the 
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policy community. Industry has also agreed to provide funding to that actor to allow 
them to develop capacity and organizational structure that gives them additional leverage 
in policy discussions. 
Lessons Learned 
The current regime governing policy and regulation of oil and gas development in 
British Columbia is far from being the ideal regime for the affected actors for several 
reasons. First, the Commission has within its mandate to increase development of oil and 
gas resources in the area in the future. This goal will certainly affect First Nations' treaty 
rights and their ability to practice traditional pursuits on their traditional lands. Several 
justices in the Metecheah case agreed that any infringement of Aboriginal and treaty 
rights was a prima facie infringement. If the number of these infringements continues to 
multiply and severely adversely affect the ability of the First Nations to continue their 
traditional pursuits will such development continue to be approved under the Sparrow 
test? Or will limitations to development have to be applied to ensure that First Nation 
people can practice their traditional pursuits in the future? That is will development have 
to be capped so that the First Nations can be assured they will be able to hunt, fish and 
trap in their treaty area? 
Second, the Commission is mostly funded by industry, a productive actor that 
receives direct material benefit from the development and by government, also a 
productive actor that receives revenues from royalties, taxes, licenses and fees. The First 
Nation actors are non-productive actors who do not receive a direct economic benefit 
from development that occurs on non-reserve traditional lands, though they would like to 
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achieve some type of revenue sharing arrangement. At this point the indirect benefits 
they receive are negligible. Only in the last decade have the communities begun to 
receive any benefit from employment and contracting and that is largely limited to labour 
intensive activities such as slashing. If the communities received more of a benefit from 
the activity as do the Nu-cha-nulth in the Clayoquot case, they would have more of a 
stake in encouraging development. 
Since industry funds a large portion of the Commission they demand quicker 
approval time on projects and more certainty of access to the land. The provincial 
government has applied legal concepts such as the Sparrow test and consultation which 
adds time to the process. First Nation groups want more influence within the decision-
making process and material benefits from development. These three actors have 
seemingly irreconcilable goals. Can all three achieve their goals? If so, how? Possible 
solutions will be posed later. 
The third issue with the process is the question that the justices discussed in both 
the Metecheah and Amoco cases: Who in government is able to ascertain whether First 
Nation treaty and Aboriginal rights are being infringed? And what constitutes a 
meaningful process to ensure that infringement is minimized? Some of the First Nation 
communities that are signatories to the MOUs argue that the present consultation process 
is a glorified delivery service where the communities are notified in detail of the 
development but their concerns are not being incorporated into the approval process. The 
Metecheah decision spells out what consultation should include. It is worth repeating. 
The Crown's duty to consult imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably 
ensure that Aboriginal peoples are provided with all necessary information in a 
timely way so that they have an opportunity to express their interests and 
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concerns, and to ensure that their representations are seriously considered and, 
wherever possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action.2 
The First Nation communities argue that although they are provided the necessary 
information, they do not have enough time to adequately consider the effects the 
proposed development may have on their rights, and their interests and concerns are not 
seriously considered and demonstrably integrated into the plan. 
Some solutions to address these issues might lie with the following models: co-
management, pre-development planning or pre-tenure consultation. A co-management 
model may be a workable solution to address some of these issues so that treaty and 
Aboriginal rights can be protected at an earlier stage in the development plan with First 
Nation input and cooperation. Co-management usually includes the sharing of resources 
or revenues. Neither government nor industry wants to give away a portion of their share 
of the profits. Government is worried about setting a precedent that might be claimed by 
other First Nation groups. They are especially reticent to set such a precedent in a treaty 
area where Aboriginal title has already been extinguished. 
Pre-development planning with First Nation input would give First Nation 
communities a more timely opportunity to ensure their rights are protected. The 
provincial government would ensure that they have met their responsibility for 
meaningful consultation and industry could be assured access to lands and timely 
applications as the planning should identify areas of concern and mitigation earlier in the 
process. The problem with this approach is the nature of the oil and gas industry is not 
conducive to pre-development planning, unlike the forestry industry that develops five 
year plans over the life of its tenure. Pre-development planning in the oil and gas 
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industry is constrained by finding the resource, getting it into production as quickly as 
possible and most importantly, the extremely competitive nature of the industry. Given 
the consultation requirements facing industry and the issues around access to lands, pre-
development planning whereby the industry proposes plans for the entire development 
cycle are likely inevitable. This will be a dramatic shift in the way the industry presently 
conducts its business. 
Pre-tenure consultation might be another alternative and could be incorporated 
into both co-management and pre-development planning. Pre-tenure consultation is a 
concept whereby consultation is done prior to the tenure being awarded to a resource 
developer. The tenure is sold to the developer with caveats so that industry has some idea 
of what limitations might be imposed on development. It could be implemented along 
with pre-development planning so that development and traditional pursuits could occur 
in a sustainable manner for future generations. Pre-tenure consultation is constrained by 
the sheer size of the oil and gas tenures that are sold and by the dearth of information that 
most First Nation groups have gathered about their traditional practices. Extensive 
traditional land use plans are generally required so that First Nation groups understand 
their past and present use of the land and areas of importance. These plans are difficult 
and expensive to do in a comprehensive and meaningful way and equally difficult to 
apply to tenure applications so that confidential information is not passed onto industry 
and meaningful mitigation can occur in specific situations. 
Whatever model is applied will have to bring First Nations into the planning 
stages earlier so that their concerns can be meaningfully addressed. Until First Nation 
90 
communities receive some direct benefit from the development, they will be less inclined 
to support development activity. 
As Thomas Berger argued, the goal of any cooperative arrangement between 
Aboriginal communities and government is not to replace the subsistence economy with a 
wage economy, which has been the traditional model the industrialized society has tried 
to impose. Instead a cooperative model should look to ensure that Aboriginal 
communities are self-sustaining both from a traditional focus and from a resource 
development focus. This means that Aboriginal peoples must have more control over the 
lands that provide them sustenance during their traditional pursuits so that natural 
resource development will not destroy their ability to practice the traditional ways. The 
First Nation communities in the northeast area of British Columbia have not achieved this 




1. The Doig River and Blueberry River First Nations are the exception as they receive 
royalty monies from oil and gas activities on their former reserve, the Fort St. John 
reserve that is located just north of Fort St. John. The band members were moved to 
new reserve locations to give returning veterans farmland after World War II. The 
federal government was to lease the mineral rights for the benefit of the bands but did 
not do so. In Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern development) (1995) the court awarded damages to compensate for lost 
past royalties and a share of future royalties. The Fort Nelson First Nation has oil 
and gas production on reserve but does not receive benefits from development on 
traditional lands off reserve. 
2. Halfway River First Nations v. B.C. BC Appeal1999, 29. 
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